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TRANSCENDENTAL DECONSTRUCTION,
TRANSCENDENT JUSTICE
J.M. Balkin*
INTRODUCTION

A meaningful encounter between two parties does not change only
the weaker or the stronger party, but both at once. We should expect
the same from any encounter between deconstruction and justice. It
might be tempting for advocates of deconstruction to hope that deconstruction would offer new insights into problems of justice, or, more
boldly, to assert that "the question of justice" can never be the same
after the assimilation of deconstructive insights. But, as a deconstructionist myself, I am naturally skeptical of all such blanket pronouncements, even - or perhaps especially - pronouncements about the
necessary utility and goodness of deconstructive practice. Instead, in
true deconstructive fashion, I would rather examine how deconstructionists' claims of what they are doing - which are often refused the
name of "theory" or "method" - are uncannily altered by their encounter with questions of justice. In fact, as I hope to show, when
deconstruction focuses on specific and concrete questions of justice, we
will discover that deconstruction has always been something quite different from what most people thought it to be.
When I first began to write about deconstruction and law, I faced
the task of translating deconstructive arguments in philosophy and
literature to the concerns of law and justice. In the process, I proposed an understanding of deconstruction that enabled it to be employed in a critical theory of law. I fully recognized then that, in
translating the insights of deconstructionists to the study of law, I was
also working a transformation - for to translate is to iterate, and iterability alters. 1 Not surprisingly, I was subsequently accused of misunderstanding both Derrida and deconstruction, and of emphasizing a
logocentric version of deconstruction that misinterpreted Derrida's
texts and subverted and undermined "true" or "proper" deconstruc* Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas. - Ed. My thanks to
Guyora Binder, David Gray Carlson, Sandy Levinson, Jay Mootz, and Tom Seung for their
comments on previous drafts of this essay.
1. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 745 & n.8,
761 n.56 (1987) (comparing the account oflegal deconstruction to a translation or alteration of
it, and offering it as a dangerous supplement to Derridean deconstruction).
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tive practice. 2
There is a certain irony to this accusation - the subversion of a
putatively "orthodox" or properly performed deconstruction by a
closet logocentrist. Yet it must be true, mustn't it, that there is a better and a worse way to engage in deconstructive argument? After all,
deconstructive arguments are studied in departments of philosophy
and comparative literature, and tests are given, and Ph.D. theses written, and degrees awarded, on the basis of this assumption. Aren't
these tests graded as better or worse, and aren't these theses subjected
to examination and sent back for revisions? How could one make
sense of what deconstructionists do if there were not a better and a
worse way to understand and perform deconstructive arguments?
Surely it cannot be the case that "everything goes," where the determination of what is or is not a better use or understanding of deconstruction is concerned.
Nevertheless, I shall short-circuit this deconstructive quandary,
which is potentially interminable. I plead guilty to the charge. If one
is to adapt deconstruction to the critical study of law, the practice of
deconstruction must, in fact, be altered, changed, modified, and, I
would even say, improved. Certain features of Derrida's texts, for example, must be emphasized and others deemphasized and regarded as
mistaken. Only in this way can deconstructive argument be made a
useful tool of critical analysis. Only in this way can it escape the many
criticisms of nihilism that have been leveled at it.
How logocentric of me.
So, I freely confess, I am a traitor to deconstruction. Yet, as we
know, "traitor" and "tradition" come from the same root: The traditionalist hands down, while the traitor hands over. In both cases there
is a passing off, a changing. (Yet the ambiguities continue: one can
pass off a baton, as in a relay race, or pass off counterfeit money or
goods.) The traitor-traditionalist distinction, with all of its accompanying uncertainties, is surely one of the most interesting for a deconstructionist. 3 There is an important sense in which I am continuing in
the tradition of deconstructive argument even as I am insufficiently
deconstructive by the standards of a purportedly "pure," "orthodox,"
"properly performed" deconstruction. If every traditionalist is also, in
2. See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1627, 1695 (1991)
("(T]his is not Derrida, and it is not deconstruction."); see also Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte,
C'est Moi'~· The Politics ofForm and the Domestication ofDeconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
1631, 1641-42 (1990).
3. For a discussion, see J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction,
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1619-20 (1990).
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some sense, a traitor to what she preserves in the name of tradition by altering it, freezing it in time, sucking the life out of it, and substituting the dry husk of unthinking imitation - might not every traitor
also be, in some sense yet to be determined, a traditionalist of the first
order?
As a traitor, however, I have an even greater satisfaction. As time
has passed, Derrida himself has followed my perfidy. He has left the
ranks of his apostles and joined the ranks of the apostates. His encounter with justice has brought him to many of the same conclusions
about the meaning and use of deconstruction I have offered. So perhaps I was following him all along, in following the direction in which
he later followed me. Perhaps I agreed with him all along, in agreeing
with that with which he would later agree. Who is the traitor, and
who the traditionalist now?
A key deconstructive idea is that iterability, or the capacity to be
repeated in new contexts, results in change. Nevertheless, in examining how repetition is linked to change, we must always keep in mind
two possible explanations, two different paths of explanation. The first
claims that what we understand later really is different from the original and is consequently an improvement or a falling away. The second
claims that this repeated thing has really always been the same; the
new context has merely altered our understanding of it, with a consequent improvement or falling away of that understanding. Often it is
very difficult to tell which claim we are making. It is often unclear
whether we are traditionalists, who preserve the old in new guises and
new understandings, or betrayers, who offer only an altered, imperfect
substitute. After all, everyone is familiar with sectarian disputes between competing groups of believers - whether religious, political, or
academic - who offer competing interpretations concerning the common object of their belief, branding their opponents as traitors while
describing themselves as keepers of the faith.
It is this type of perfidy (which is at the same time a form of faithfulness), this alteration of deconstruction (which is at the same time
not an alteration) that I would like to discuss here.
Of course, a deconstructionist must have texts to work with, texts
to make her argument with. I take as my texts three writings by
Jacques Derrida. The first is a lecture he gave in 1989 at a conference
at the Cardozo Law School on "Deconstruction and the Possibility of
Justice." This talk was later published under the title Force of Law:
"The Mystical Foundation of Authority'~ 4 In this address, he an4. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11

CARDOZO

L.
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swered critics who accused deconstruction of nihilism or (perhaps
worse) political quietism and complete irrelevance to questions of justice. Derrida replied that, far from failing to address the question of
justice, deconstruction had addressed little else. 5 As evidence he listed
a series of recent articles he had written that, in his opinion, concerned
questions of justice. 6
Of course, from a deconstructionist's standpoint, what might be
most interesting about this list are the articles that Derrida did not
choose to mention. One might think that these articles were withheld
because they were wholly irrelevant to questions of justice. After all,
in several of the writings that Derrida does mention, it takes quite a
stretch to see them as directly addressing the question of justice.7 A
fortiori, the articles not mentioned must be even more divorced from
these issues. Yet no deconstructionist worth her salt would accept
such an obvious attempt at marginalization so readily; it would be like
waving a red flag in front of a bull. Let us look, then, at the discarded,
irrelevant parts of the Derridean corpus. Among them we find two
substantial pieces on the controversy surrounding Paul de Man's wartime journalism. s
The basic story surrounding this scandal is by now well known. 9
Paul de Man, Sterling Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale
University, was a close friend of Jacques Derrida and one of the central figures in the development of literary deconstruction. He died in
1983, a beloved and respected teacher and scholar. In 1987, a young
graduate student doing research for a thesis on de Man discovered
articles de Man had written between 1940 and 1942 for the Belgian
newspaper Le Soir. During the Nazi occupation of Belgium, Le Soir
was seized by pro-German forces and used as a mouthpiece for proN azi propaganda and antisemitic statements. 10 De Man wrote for Le
Soir during that period. He was still in his early twenties. Some of his
Rev. 919 (1990) (Mary Quaintance trans.). A slightly different version of this essay appears in
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992).
5. Derrida, supra note 4, at 935.
6. Id. at 929 (listing various writings on Levinas, Hegel, Freud, Kafka, Nelson Mandela, and
the Declaration of Independence).
7. See, for example, JACQUES DERRIDA, GLAS (1974), whose subject matter has never pre·
cisely been determined.
8. Jacques Derrida, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments, 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 812
(1989) (Peggy Kamuf trans.) [hereinafter Derrida, Biodegradables]; Jacques Derrida, Like the
Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War. 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 590 (1988)
(Peggy Kamuf trans.) [hereinafter Derrida, Paul de Man's War].
9. For various accounts, see DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES: DECONSTRUCTION
AND THE FALL OF PAUL DE MAN (1991); RESPONSES: ON PAUL DE MAN'S WARTIME JOUR·
NALISM (Werner Hamacher et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter RESPONSES].
10. See Werner Hamacher et al., Paul de Man, a Chronology, 1919-49 in RESPONSES, supra
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articles were exclusively literary, while others were in various degrees
concerned with politics. Moreover, as Derrida himself puts it, the
"massive, immediate, and dominant effect" of de Man's political articles conformed to the "official rhetoric ... of the occupation forces." 11
And one article in particular, The Jews in Contemporary Literature, 12
is overtly antisemitic.
The revelation of these writings created a furor in the academy
over de Man's posthumous reputation, the relation of his past writings
to his later academic work, and the possible relationship between de
Man's wartime activities and the normative 9laims - or lack of normative claims - of deconstruction. Many silly and intemperate accusations were leveled on all sides of this dispute. In the midst of this
controversy, Derrida wrote two substantial articles. In the first, The
Sound of the Deep Sea Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War, 13 he defends his old friend - and deconstruction itself - from what he regards as unjust accusation, and he tries to place de Man's life and
works in their proper perspective. In the second, Biodegradables: Six
Literary Fragments, 14 he responds to six critics of the previous essay.
Here he defends not only de Man and deconstruction, but also himself,
from what he regards as unjust treatment and unfair criticism.
One can agree or disagree with Derrida's particular stance on these
issues. Nevertheless, it is hard to argue that these articles do not raise,
on every line of every page, issues of justice, responsibility, and fair
treatment. Their major concerns are how one should judge de Man,
deconstruction, and Derrida himself, and how various critics have
fairly or unfairly treated them. The question of responsibility overhangs the entire discussion - responsibility for the Holocaust, responsibility for collaboration, responsibility for one's silence about
collaboration, responsibility in reading the work of another person,
and responsibility in judging another's life and works.
Posed in the often byzantine setting of academic disputes and academic reputations, these articles concern the most concrete questions
of justice and raise the most impassioned prose from Derrida. Indeed,
the second article borders on the polemical. They stand in marked
contrast to the relatively abstract pronouncements on justice and renote 9, at xiii. Members of the Belgian public derisively referred to the captured institution as Le
Soir vole ("The Stolen Evening"). Id.
11. Derrida, Paul de Man's War. supra note 8, at 607 (emphasis omitted). Derrida offers the
same formula in Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 822, as proof that he was not underplaying the malignancy of de Man's writings.
12. Paul de Man, Les Juifs dans la Litterature Actue/le, LE Sorn, Mar. 4, 1941, at 1.
13. Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8.
14. Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8.
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sponsibility Derrida offers in his Cardozo Law School address, Force
of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority.
Thus, it is all the more puzzling that Derrida did not think to list
these essays in his catalogue of examples of deconstruction's encounter
with justice. Derrida could hardly have forgotten them, for they had
only recently been published when he gave his address at Cardozo.
Nor could he have expected that his audience would not know about
them, for they were published in a well-known literary journal; indeed
the first article had attracted considerable controversy and led to a
symposium of critiques in which the second appeared as a response. 15
Nor can one object that these two articles do not discuss deconstruction or employ deconstructive techniques. In fact, both possess interesting and sustained discussions of deconstruction and its place in the
academy, as well as many passages explicitly offering and rejecting
possible connections between deconstruction and justice, or between
deconstruction on the one hand and fascism or totalitarianism on the
other.
Perhaps one might think that these articles are not worthy of mention precisely because they are so concerned with a particular event,
and therefore lack universalizability. Yet, as Derrida himself reminds
us in his Cardozo address, justice is always addressed to events and
persons in all of their singularity. 16 What better way, one might think,
to discover what Derrida really thinks about justice than to study his
remarks concerning an issue about which he feels the most deeply,
which gets him, as the saying goes, "where he lives"? We often witness people speaking abstractly, in high sounding phrases, about what
is just and what is good. Yet, one might believe, we only see what they
really think about these matters when they are faced with a concrete
question of justice that truly affects them. So I read these three texts
together - the abstract disposition on justice with the more concrete
discussions of the de Man controversy. The first is sedate, the others
brimming with anger and anguish. The relationship of deconstruction
to justice lies somewhere in the conversation between them.
Of course, there is a sense, too, in which even the more abstract
Cardozo Law School address, which nowhere explicitly mentions de
Man, is motivated by and concerns the de Man controversy. For by
the late 1980s this scandal had raised anew accusations that deconstruction was the easy refuge of nihilists or those without values or
conscience, that a doctrine that found complications of meaning in all
15. See Symposium, On Jacques Derrida's "Paul de Man's War," 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 765
(1989).
16. Derrida, supra note 4, at 949.
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texts was tailor-made for collaborationists with evil, unscrupulous opportunists, or simply weak-willed souls unable to commit to a just
course of action when faced with obstacles or uncertainties. Thus,
when Derrida rose to address the audience at the Cardozo Law School
in the fall of 1989 - which was also the fall of the 1980s - it was all
the more important to establish that deconstruction was not, nor had
it ever been, nihilistic, opposed to justice, or even (God forbid) unconcerned with justice, but that it was, quite the contrary, fully committed to the critique of injustice and the creation of a more just world.
Deconstruction, Derrida hoped to convince his audience, could properly be used for beneficial purposes of social and cultural critique, and
indeed, it was perhaps most correctly used for such purposes.
Yet, in rising to respond to these critics, just as he had previously
responded to the critics of de Man, Derrida offered examples of deconstructive argument that were not wholly consistent with all of his previous deconstructive writings. They are, however, consistent with the
practice of deconstruction that I have advocated. This is Derrida's
perfidy, his betrayal of deconstruction. Yet it is a betrayal that I
heartily endorse.
In these essays, Derrida offers four different statements of the possible connection between deconstruction and justice. First, deconstruction can call into question the boundaries that determine who is a
proper subject of justice - that is, to whom justice is owed. Second,
deconstruction demands "a responsibility without limits." 17 Third,
deconstruction requires one to address the Other in the language of
the Other. Fourth, deconstruction is opposed to all intellectual forms
of totalitarianism, and hence, by analogy, to political totalitarianism as
well.
Like Derrida, I am also concerned with deconstruction's possible
relationship to justice. In this essay, I offer an extended critique of
Derrida's views in order to make two basic points about the relationship between justice and deconstruction. First, Derrida offers deconstructive arguments that cut both ways: Although one can use
deconstructive arguments to further what Derrida believes is just, one
can also deconstruct in a different way to reach conclusions he would
probably find very unjust. One can also question his careful choice of
targets of deconstruction: One could just as easily have chosen different targets and, by deconstructing them, reach conclusions that he
would find abhorrent. Thus, in each case, what makes Derrida's
deconstructive argument an argument for justice is not its use of
17. Id. at 953.
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deconstruction, but the selection of the particular text or concept to
deconstruct and the way in which the particular deconstructive argument is wielded. I shall argue that Derrida's encounter with justice
really shows that deconstructive argument is a species of rhetoric,
which can be used for different purposes depending upon the moral
and political commitments of the deconstructor.
Second, and equally important, Derrida's use of deconstructive argument to critique existing arrangements as unjust presumes belief in
an idea of justice that may be indeterminate but is not reducible to any
conventional notion of justice. Derrida's arguments simply make no
sense unless he is relying on a transcendental idea of justice, which
human law only imperfectly articulates. Moreover, I shall argue, he
admits this, albeit only tentatively and haltingly, in his more recent
writings on deconstruction.
Derrida's resistance to such a recognition is altogether understandable. A postulation of transcendent human values brings us a long
way from the philosophical conception Derrida offered in Of Grammatology. 18 There he argued against the very existence of a "transcendental signified" and made his famous statement that "[t]here is
nothing outside of the text." 19 Nevertheless, I believe that a transformation of deconstruction becomes inevitable when deconstructionists
begin to confront real questions of justice and injustice. If deconstruction can have salutary effects for the study of legal theory, there are
equally salutary effects that law can have for deconstruction. So, I
argue, when we try to make sense of Derrida's arguments about law
and justice and read them charitably to avoid confusing and self-contradictory interpretations, we arrive at an important variant of deconstructive practice, which relies on the existence of human values that
transcend any given culture. For want of a better name, I shall call
this type of deconstruction transcendental deconstruction. It is the
form of deconstruction I have advocated in my own work.
A belief in transcendental values is often associated with the tradition of Platonism. However, the view I am concerned with is not the
Platonism of the Republic. 20 It does not assert the existence of eternal
and unchanging Ideas that exist in a Platonic Heaven. It does not
postulate normative standards of determinate content. Rather, it is
18. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri
Univ. Press 1976) (1967).

c.

Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins

19. Id. at 158 (emphasis omitted).
20. PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 575 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., Bollingen Foundation 1961) [hereinafter COLLECTED DIALOGUES]
(Paul Shorey trans., 1930).

March 1994]

Transcendental Deconstruction

1139

concerned with those indeterminate values or urges located in the
human soul, which human beings articulate through positive morality
and cultural conventions, and which nevertheless always escape this
articulation.
Surprisingly enough, the origins of this nonplatonic transcendentalism also lie in Plato's work. Plato came to a similar view after he
had written the Republic, in later dialogues like the Statesman, 21
Sophist, 22 and particularly the Laws. 23 He abandoned his earlier
dreams of political perfection for a more democratic, skeptical vision. 24 By the time of the Laws, Plato realized that our idea of justice
is inchoate and indeterminate. It is a mere skeleton; it must be fleshed
out in the world of culture. For this reason, we must construct a conception of justice using our human values and intuitions. T.K. Seung
has called this approach "platonic constructivism"; he argues that it is
a substantial modification of the more familiar Platonism we recall
from the Republic. 25 But Seung's constructivism has a curious consequence: The articulation of our values in human culture, law, and
convention makes these concrete articulations different from the inchoate values they articulate. It is this gap or discrepancy that deconstructive argument seizes upon as the basis for its critique. The
essence of what I am calling transcendental deconstruction, then, is to
note the interval between the human capacity for judgment and evaluation that inevitably and necessarily transcends the creations of culture, and the prescriptions and evaluations of that culture, which in
tum articulate and exemplify human values like justice. It is in this
sense that transcendental deconstruction depends, as Platonism itself
does, on a conception of values that "go beyond" the positive norms of
culture and convention. But these transcendent values do not come to
us in a fully determinate form; they need culture to tum their inchoate
sense into an articulated conception. And these transcendent values
do not exist in an imaginary Platonic Heaven; they exist rather in the
wellsprings of the human soul.
The idea of values that "transcend" culture might suggest that
when human beings evaluate they do so from a place outside culture.
21. PLATO, Statesman, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 20, at 1018 (J.B. Skemp
trans., 1952).
22. PLATO, Sophist, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 20, at 957 (Francis M. Cornford
trans., 1935).
23. PLATO, Laws, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 20, at 1225 (A.E. Taylor trans.,
1934).
24. Here I draw on the excellent discussion in T.K. SEUNG, INTUITION AND CONSTRUCTION: THE FOUNDATION OF NORMATIVE THEORY 175-211 (1993).
25. T.K. SEUNG, KANT'S PLATONIC REVOLUTION (forthcoming 1994).

1140

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 92:1131

But it is difficult to make sense of this claim, because culture helps
constitute us as individuals. Thus, standing outside of culture would
be like standing outside of ourselves. We can only express our values
through their articulations in culture. How, then, is it possible to
speak of transcendent human values when the ways we express our
values must always be immanent in culture? How can values be both
immanent and transcendent?
To understand how values can be transcendent, we must recognize
that value is properly a verb, not a noun. People do not "have" values
as if they were objects that could be kept in their pockets. Rather,
they possess an inexhaustible drive to evaluate - to name the beautiful and the ugly, the better and the worse. This feature of human
evaluation is poorly captured by our standard metaphors of value.
These are metaphors of determinate measurement: Values work like
scales or rulers, and to evaluate is to measure. These metaphors have
two important conceptual entailments: The first is that a value provides a fixed standard of measurement; the second is that there is a
necessary separation between the value that measures and the thing
measured. If a value is a standard of measure, it must be determinate
just as a ruler is of a determinate length. Moreover, it must exist separately from the thing it measures. One cannot use a ruler to measure
itself any more than one can use a balance to weigh itself. Hence, the
metaphor of measurement leads us to assume that values can be transcendent only if they somehow exist as determinate standards apart
from the culture that they measure. This leads to Plato's ontology,
and, I submit, to Plato's error.
Instead we must consider a contrasting metaphor of value - that
of an indeterminate urge or demand. Instead of viewing values as determinate standards of measurement, we should understand them as a
sort of insatiable and inchoate drive to evaluate. Because they are inchoate they can never be made fully determinate; because they are insatiable they can never be fully satisfied. Our values are like an
inexhaustible yearning for something that cannot clearly and fully be
described; hence our values always demand more of us than we can
ever satisfy, despite our best efforts.
Thus, we have two metaphorical accounts of value: one of determinate measurement, and one of indeterminate longing. Each is helpful in its own way, but neither can be usefully employed in all contexts
and circumstances. To understand the phenomenon of transcendence
we must recognize the metaphor of measurement as a metaphor, and
exchange it for a different one.
The metaphor of value as an insatiable urge or demand offers a
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more plausible account of how our values are transcendent and why
our articulations of them are imperfect. Under the metaphor of measurement, our institutions fail to be just because they are imperfect
representations of a determinate standard of justice; this standard is
transcendent because it exists separate and apart from culture. Thus,
virtue is a matter of copying, and the virtuous person is a good copyist.
Under the contrasting metaphor, values are inchoate yearnings that
we attempt to articulate through our cultural constructions. To be
just we must construct examples of justice using the indeterminate
urge for justice as our goad rather than as our guide. This means that
the virtuous person is not a good copyist but a good architect. She
attempts to satisfy her sense of justice by constructing just institutions.
Nevertheless, she responds to an indefinite and indeterminate value.
This has two consequences. First, there will be many different ways of
constructing a just institution, depending upon the situation in which
she finds herself and the resources she has available to her. Second,
her constructed example of justice will never exhaust the insatiable
longings of human value. Thus, human cultural creations will always
fail to be perfectly just, but not because they are defective copies of a
determinate standard. Their imperfection arises from the necessary
inadequation that must exist between an indeterminate and inexhaustible urge and any concrete and determinate articulation of justice.
This relationship of inadequacy between culture and value is what we
mean by "transcendence." The goal of transcendental deconstruction
is to rediscover this transcendence where it has been forgotten.
Some people have thought that deconstruction is aimless; that it
has no goal or purpose. Others have argued that at best its goal is the
mindless destruction and annihilation of all conceptual distinctions.
Neither charge applies to the form of deconstructive practice I advocate here. Transcendental deconstruction has a goal; its goal is not
destruction but rectification. 26 The deconstructor critiques for the
purpose of betterment; she seeks out unjust or inappropriate conceptual hierarchies in order to assert a better ordering. 27 Hence, her argument is always premised on the possibility of an alternative to existing
norms that is not simply different, but also more just, even if the results of this deconstruction are imperfect and subject to further deconstruction. Such a deconstruction assumes that it is possible to speak
meaningfully of the more or the less just; it decidedly rejects the claim
26. I borrow this expression from T.K. Seung. Id.
27. For a defense of this normative approach to deconstruction, see J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem ofLegal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J.
105, 124-27 (1993).
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that nothing is more just than anything else, or that all things are
equally just. Rather than effacing the distinction between the just and
unjust, it attempts to reveal the mistaken identification of justice with
an inadequate articulation of justice in human culture and law.
If this analysis is sound, deconstructive argument becomes something quite different from what most of its critics (and even some of its
adherents) have imagined. Now deconstructive argument is premised
on the assumption of transcendent yet only imperfectly realizable values of justice and truth. The practice of deconstructive argument may
be skeptical about the perfection of any and every particular example
of justice, but it is decidedly not nihilistic. Indeed, it is a deconstruction founded on faith - faith in human values which, although only
articulable through culture, surpass and hence act as a perpetual admonition to culture. This is the type of deconstructive practice I have
advocated, and the one that makes the most sense when applied to law
and political theory.
Jacques Derrida, I shall argue, has gradually come around to a
similar view, although he would not perhaps use the term transcendental to describe it. Yet it is an inevitable consequence of the connections he now wishes to draw between deconstruction and justice.
Moreover, he has begun to insist that something like this is what he
always had in mind by deconstruction. 28 Is this an adequate description of his project or a specious substitution? Is this tradition or betrayal? That is for the reader to judge.
I.

DECONSTRUCTION AND THE SUBJECTS OF JUSTICE

The first connection between justice and deconstruction that Derrida hopes to demonstrate concerns the definition of who is a subject
of justice, that is, who can be treated justly or unjustly. Throughout
Western civilization, Derrida argues, the category of subjects of justice
has been limited. 2 9 Deconstruction furthers justice, he insists, because
it calls these limitations into question. 30
Derrida argues that Western civilization has traditionally considered justice and injustice to be concepts that apply only to persons, in
particular to persons who possess the capability of language. 31 These
are persons whom one can speak to - and hence reason with. "[O]ne
28. Here one must be sensitive to the possibility that my assessment of Derrida applies with
equal force to me: Repetition of older arguments in new contexts may have produced changes in
views that I claim always to have held.
29. Derrida, supra note 4, at 951-53.
30. Id. at 953-55.
31. Id. at 951.
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would not speak of injustice or violence toward an animal, even less
toward a vegetable or a stone."32 For example, "[a]n animal can be
made to suffer, but we would never say, in a sense considered proper,
that it is a wronged subject, the victim of a crime ... and this is true a
fortiori, we think, for what we call vegetable or mineral or intermediate species like the sponge." 33 Indeed, Derrida continues, throughout
human history "[t]here have been, there still are many 'subjects'
among mankind who are not yet recognized as subjects and who receive this animal treatment .... " 34 To treat a person as an animalthat is, one who is incapable of being addressed in language - is to
consider that person's treatment not to be a question of justice or injustice. This argument reminds one of Chief Justice Taney's famous
assertion in Dred Scott v. Sandford 35 that blacks "had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect." 36 Derrida even suggests that
the primitive tradition of animal sacrifice confirmed and supported the
notion of a separation between human subjects - who can speak and
are the subjects and objects of just and unjust treatment - and "animals" who, by the logic of this opposition, are not capable of being
treated unjustly.37
The boundaries of justice, in other words, are determined by the
boundaries of who is "human" as opposed to who is merely an
"animal" - that is, one without language or, alternatively, without a
recognized right to speak. Yet these boundaries and the justifications
for these boundaries can be deconstructed, even to the point, as some
animal rights activists would maintain, of calling into question the exclusion of animal life from questions of justice. At this point the distinction between "human" and "animal" would no longer serve to
distinguish subjects of justice from nonsubjects; we would have to invent a new distinction.
Thus, Derrida argues, the opposition "subject of justice" versus
"nonsubject of justice" is unstable. Because of its instability, it may
continually be questioned, and the criteria that separate the subjects of
justice from those nonsubjects - earlier identified by the distinction
between "humans" and "animals" - must continually be revised.
Hence, Derrida wants to insist, deconstruction is relevant to justice
because we can deconstruct the boundaries of who is considered a
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
Derrida, supra note 4, at 951..
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"person" or, more generally, a proper subject of justice. By challenging these boundaries, we can move from a world in which the conception of a subject of justice is wrongfully limited to one in which it
receives a just expansion. 38
In this way, Derrida insists, the use of deconstruction might not
lead to nihilism or injustice. Instead deconstruction would form part
of a progressive project that sought increasingly to expand political
rights to those other than white male European human beings by
deconstructing the boundaries of who are and are not the proper subjects of justice. As he says, in a slightly different context, "[n]othing
seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal." 39
These egalitarian sentiments are surely to be applauded. Yet Derrida has not shown a necessary connection between deconstruction
and justice. He has merely pointed out that one might deconstruct
certain oppositions in a way that produces increasingly egalitarian
conclusions. He has not shown that these are the only oppositions one
might deconstruct. Nor has he shown that one can only deconstruct
these oppositions in a way that produces increasingly egalitarian
results.
Derrida might have chosen to deconstruct or problematize the distinction between justice and injustice, between liberty and slavery, or
between tolerance and bigotry. He does not do so. But nothing in
deconstructive theory - if such a thing exists - directs him or forbids him from doing so. Deconstructive argument does not cease to
operate when the conclusions one might draw from it are inegalitarian,
although it is hardly surprising that Jacques Derrida sees egalitarian
consequences flowing from his use of deconstruction. Indeed, this possibility is admitted by his very claim that deconstruction "does not
necessarily lead to injustice ... but may ... lead to a reinterpretation"
that is more just.40 Derrida, like every good deconstructor, picks his
targets carefully.
Moreover, even given the targets of his deconstruction - the historically enforced oppositions between the subjects and nonsubjects of
justice - Derrida has not shown that the only way in which these
38. As Derrida puts it:
[A] deconstructionist approach to the boundaries that institute the human subject (preferably and paradigmatically the adult male, rather than the woman, child or animal) as the
measure of the just and the unjust, does not necessarily lead to injustice, nor to the effacement of an opposition between just and unjust but may, in the name of a demand more
insatiable than justice, lead to a reinterpretation of the whole apparatus of boundaries within
which a history and a culture have been able to confine their criteriology.
Id. at 953.
39. Id. at 971.
40. Cf. id. at 953 (emphasis added).
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oppositions might be deconstructed leads to increasingly just results.
If deconstruction calls into question the boundaries of subjects of justice, it does not follow that the only way to question these boundaries
is to advocate their expansion. They may well be unstable, as Derrida
insists. Yet their instability might be evidence that they are about to
implode, rather than expand. Furthermore, even if"there must be an
expansion, one can expand the boundary in two opposite directions by expanding the scope of what is assigned to the "human," who is a
subject of justice, or by expanding the scope of what is assigned to the
"nonhuman," which is not a proper subject of justice. In this way, the
instability of these boundaries might well be used, as it has in the past,
to show that blacks, or Asians, or women are not fully human beings,
or that the distinction between women and animals, for example, is so
unstable that it cannot fully be maintained.
Indeed, one can understand the history of bigotry as the continuous deconstruction of an imagined unity of humankind. It is the perpetual claim that the unity of humankind is a pious fiction, a paperedover discontinuity and heterogeneity, and that the Other within this
imagined unity must be located and understood in all of its difference
and inferiority. The egalitarian claims to rediscover the true similarity
of the subjects of justice by reclaiming those who were wrongly
grouped with nonsubjects; the bigot claims to rediscover the true similarity of nonsubjects of justice by rejecting those who were wrongly
grouped with the subjects of justice. Both deconstruct boundaries and
categories, and the act of deconstruction does not decide between
them.
One might also use deconstruction to show that the boundaries of
who may possess certain civil and political rights are unstable. Thus,
early American feminists argued that the expansion of political rights
to black males required the expansion of political rights to women.
However, a similar criticism applies here. The claim that the current
limitations of political rights - like the franchise or the right to life are unstable and that the justifications for these boundaries are selfdeconstructing may argue in favor of further restricting the scope of
these rights rather than expanding them. If the extension of antidiscrimination laws to disabled persons cannot be squared with the denial
of such rights to homosexuals, then perhaps this result counsels in the
direction of shrinking the rights of the disabled rather than expanding
the rights of homosexuals. The strongly egalitarian bias of the academy makes this an unthinkable position, but it is not made unthinkable by any feature of "deconstructive theory." It is made unthinkable
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by the preexisting moral commitments of those who make the deconstructive argument.
If one begins with an egalitarian ideology, one can easily be misled
into thinking that the "emancipatory ideal" that Derrida endorses is
the same as deconstruction. But this assumption is based on an implicit opposition or conceptual homology - namely, that deconstruction is to logocentrism as emancipation is to slavery, or as expansion of
the subjects of justice is to contraction of the subjects of justice. Of
course, one of the most important deconstructive techniques is the
demonstration that the homology "A is to B as C is to D" is reversible;
one deconstructs ideologies by subverting the conceptual homologies
upon which they rest. My point is that this technique can be performed as easily with the present set of conceptual oppositions as with
the opposition between speech and writing in Of Grammatology.
Furthermore, even if one accepted that deconstruction necessarily
led to an increased domain of subjects of justice, Derrida's argument
rests on the additional assumption that increasing the number of subjects of justice increases justice. But it does not. The second half of
the nineteenth century saw two great expansions of the domain of subjects of justice in the United States. The first was the emancipation of
the slaves and the bestowal of civil and political rights upon them
through the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. The
second came twenty years later in Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad, 41 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that corporations were persons for purposes of the civil and political rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Derrida's terms,
corporations too became subjects of justice, and indeed, through the
same constitutional amendment that granted civil rights to blacks.
The result of this decision was that corporations had contract and
property rights against other individuals that the courts were constitutionally bound to enforce, and they did so with a vengeance during
America's Gilded Age, with results that today make most economic
egalitarians shudder.42 The legacy of Santa Clara continues to this
41. 116 U.S. 394 (1886).
42. I want to emphasize here that the granting of "personhood" and even "citizenship" to
corporations was originally designed to protect the property interests of individuals who owned
shares in a corporation. To this extent, the expansion of corporate rights seems a perfectly justifi·
able protection of individual property rights - assuming always that the theorist in question
believes that the basic structure of economic rights is justified. It therefore furthers, rather than
detracts from, the "emancipatory ideal." However, one might protect these individual property
rights in ways other than by creating a new legal subject with constitutional rights. The egalitarian critique, as I understand it, is that the choice of this strategy has had unexpected consequences that cannot all be explained as necessary to protect the (just) rights of shareholders. To
some degree the fiction of the corporation as a person has taken on a life of its own and has been
used to work injustices and denials of individual rights. See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.
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day: The Supreme Court has held that corporations as constitutional
"persons" have First Amendment speech rights like those of private
citizens. 43 This holding seems unexceptional but for the fact that corporations usually have considerably more money and therefore can
exercise their speech rights more effectively than the average citizen,
through donations to political campaigns, purchase of time and space
on broadcast and print media, and so on. The recognition and protection of corporate civil and political rights has enabled corporations to
convert huge concentrations of property rights into concentrations of
political power and thereby exercise considerable control over the
American political process. Not surprisingly, some scholars on the
left find these results to be perverse and to represent a net loss of individual liberty.44
In recent times, one of the most pressing questions before the
American public has been the scope of the right to abortion.
Antiabortion activists have been on the forefront of expanding the
boundaries of personhood. One might almost believe that they were
taking their cue from Derrida, for their arguments are nothing if not
deconstructive: Effacing the distinction between fetus and child, they
have argued that fetuses are "babies" and doctors who perform abortions are "baby killers." Insisting on the undecideability of any
boundaries (such as viability) between the person and the nonperson,
they have characterized the current law of the United States as the
most violent act of mass murder since the Holocaust. If, as Derrida
points out, justice and injustice have been reserved in Western culture
to the possessors of language, and if this reservation is itself in need of
destabilizing and deconstructing - in the case of animals, for example
- the contemporary antiabortion advocate can hardly be faulted for
seeing in this claim an argument for the protection of defenseless fetuses, who lack the power of speech and are routinely slaughtered by
v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 87-90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that Santa Clara should be
overruled); c. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 220-21 (1991). For
an examination of some of the alternative ways the issue might have been conceptualized and the
consequences of the Santa Clara decision, see Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985).
43. See First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down limitations on corporate spending designed to influence voters).
44. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 253
(David Kairys ed., 1982); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-91
(1987) (describing the media's control of public debate and business's control of the political
process). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has itself been somewhat equivocal on the question of
whether the scope of this First Amendment right should be equal in all respects to the right
enjoyed by natural persons. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990). The question for Derrida, of course, is whether further deconstruction of the boundary
that excludes corporations from full membership as "subjects of justice" would be a good thing
or a bad thing.
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those who possess this power. Everything that Derrida says about the
exclusion of animals from the domain of justice, they might argue,
could be said on behalf of the human fetus: If a cat or a chimpanzee
should be protected from torture or vivisection, how much more so
should the human fetus who likewise lacks the power of speech, and
who likewise is slaughtered for the benefit of those whom the state has
already recognized as subjects of justice - women?
Needless to say, many women's groups and commentators on the
left (including, one assumes - although one does not know this for
certain - Derrida himself) would find such an argument abhorrent.
But is the argument abhorrent because it is not deconstructive or
rather because it is deconstructive - because nothing in "deconstruction" prevents such an argument? Is the reason that a feminist who
employs deconstruction would not make such an argument because
deconstruction forbids it or because it conflicts with her deeply held
moral and political commitments - her sense of the just and the unjust? In other words, isn't she really using deconstructive argument to
make sense of her existing commitments, to articulate her values?
In the examples of corporate speech, or the pros and cons of abortion, we witness what I call "ideological drift" at work. 45 An argument or principle that appears on its face to have determinate political
consequences turns out to bear a very different political valence when
it is inserted into new and unexpected contexts. Yet because, as
deconstruction itself reminds us, one cannot fully control the contexts
into which an argument or a claim can be inserted, one cannot fully
control its political valence in future situations. The notion of ideological drift follows from the basic deconstructive point that iterability
alters. We have merely applied this point to the practice of deconstructive argument itself. If the practices of deconstruction by human
beings are themselves subject to the insights of deconstruction, this
alteration seems inevitably to follow. The practice of deconstruction
by human beings must also be subject to ideological drift. So is Derrida then hoisted on his own petard? If what is called "deconstruction" is a rhetorical practice, a series of arguments, a set of approaches
that can be taught, repeated, iterated, used again and again in different
contexts, places, and times, all this would seem to follow. Deconstruction, or more correctly deconstructive arguments made by human beings, must be iterable in ways that lead to both just and unjust results.

45. See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869
(1993).
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What, then, of this "if"? We are not prepared to answer this question. At least not yet.

II.

A
A.

REsPONSIBILITY WITHOUT LIMITS

The Infinite and the Indefinite

Let us continue. Derrida posits a second possible relation between
deconstruction and justice - it is "[t]he sense of a responsibility without limits."46 This responsibility is "necessarily excessive, incalculable, before memory." 47 Deconstruction leads to justice because it
reveals the limitlessness of our responsibility.
Nevertheless, a responsibility without limits is not the same thing
as justice. We do not necessarily increase justice by increasing responsibility. Suppose a plaintiff is injured in a traffic accident. The plaintiff
picks a name at random from the phone directory and sues this person
as a defendant. We do not necessarily increase justice by holding this
person liable for the accident. Justice is increased by eliminating her
responsibility.
Nor do we necessarily increase justice by increasing the responsibility of all persons. Suppose that a defendant strikes a plaintiff because the plaintiff is homosexual and the defendant hates
homosexuals. We can justly hold the defendant responsible for this
brutality. Suppose, however, that the defendant argues as follows:
His parents are also responsible because they abused him as a child.
The bystanders on the street are responsible because they did not intervene on the plaintiff's behalf. The police are responsible because
they did not prevent the injury from occurring. The state's mental
health agencies are responsible because they did not offer the defendant free counseling to deal with his aggression and his hatred of homosexuals, and so on.
The difficulty is that to increase the responsibility of one person is
often to decrease the responsibility of another. Here the defendant
attempts to decrease his responsibility by shifting it to third parties.
There is no problem in increasing the responsibility of all persons as
long as we insist that the defendant also remains fully responsible. Indeed, this may be a more adequate description of the situation. The
difficulty arises anew, however, when we determine the appropriate
remedy for an injustice. How are we to divide up the responsibility
when the plaintiff demands compensation? The more persons who are
held responsible, the less each will have to pay, all other things being
46. Derrida, supra note 4, at 953.
47. Id.
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equal. We might try to avoid this dilemma by allowing the plaintiff
full recovery from each person held responsible, but surely this solution creates its own form of injustice.48
The demand for an increase of justice is not necessarily the demand for increased responsibility. It is rather the demand for an appropriate apportionment of responsibility. That is what '~ust" means
- neither too much nor too little, but just the right amount of responsibility for each person. The very notion of apportionment implies the
possibility that the responsibility of some persons will be decreased, if
not eliminated. Justice involves the recognition that people are simply
not responsible for some of the things for which others would like to
hold them responsible. Furthermore, the demand for an appropriate
apportionment of responsibility presupposes that there is a notion of
appropriateness - that not every assertion of responsibility is as valid
as any other. If the deconstructive argument is to make sense, it must
assume that one's responsibility goes as far as it should, but no further,
whether or not this can be known for certain.
In this light, Derrida's essays on Paul de Man offer a useful counterweight to his more abstract formulation. In these essays, Derrida
does not assert that either he, or de Man, have limitless responsibility.
Rather, he attempts to put de Man's responsibility in its proper perspective. He attempts to offer a just apportionment of responsibility,
blame, and innocence regarding de Man, himself, and his critics.
First, Derrida argues, de Man is not responsible for all of the many
evils of Nazism or for the Holocaust. To compare him to Mengele, as
one writer did, is unjust. 4 9 Second, it is unjust to read de Man's later
writings as an admission of guilt or responsibility - or as an attempt
to deny responsibility - for what he did during World War 11. 50
Third, although de Man wrote a series of articles expressing the ideology of the occupation forces and one article which is blatantly antisemitic, it is unjust to judge his whole life based on that one episode
in his youth. 51 Fourth - and this is the most controversial point in
his argument - Derrida suggests that de Man's articles are not as
48. Increasing responsibility, moreover, always comes at a cost. The more things for which
people are held responsible, the less time and money they have for their own pursuits. Responsi·
bility to others comes at the price of one's freedom of action as well as one's security. An infinite
protection of security for all will result in an infinite responsibility for all, which will paradoxi·
cally abolish the liberty of all, and with it the security of all. The demand for infinite responsibil·
ity is like the paradoxical predicament of the pantheist who finds she must remain motionless
because she fears that any movement on her part will inadvertently destroy a bug or a microorga·
nism. Whatever she does, she is responsible. Yet her failure to act makes her doubly responsible.
49. See Derrida, Biodegradab/es, supra note 8, at 821.
SO. Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8, at 640-51.
51. Id. at 650-51.
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damning as one might be led to expect when they are read in the appropriate context. According to Derrida, the explicit antisemitism of
the worst article is equivocal, and it is hardly as bad as many other
articles in Le Soir. 52
In the same way, Derrida responds to the critics who attacked his
discussion of de Man by arguing that his responsibility and that of the
institution they call "Deconstruction" is less than they imply or contend. They are unjust to Derrida, a Jew who was a teenager during
the Second World War: "I ... who have nothing whatever to do with
everything that happened; I who, at the time, was rather on the side of
the victims." 53 They are unjust as well to the practitioners of deconstruction, "which at the time was at year minus twenty-five of its
calendar!" 54
These remarks suggest that Derrida cannot mean by "a responsibility without limits" a limitless responsibility. Otherwise, he, de
Man, and indeed all of us are responsible without limits for the Holocaust and many other horrible crimes, both past and present. But this
would not be just: The demand of justice is often the demand that we
are not responsible, even though we have been unjustly accused.
Instead, we must offer an alternative account of "a responsibility
without limits" that saves it from these difficulties. This account inevitably leads us to the transcendental conception of deconstruction. A
limitless responsibility could be an infinite responsibility, or it could be
a responsibility whose full contours cannot be defined in advance.
This is the distinction between the infinite and the indefinite. We can
say, both in the case of the infinite and the indefinite, that one cannot
draw determinate and clear boundaries, so that in both cases we are, in
a sense, "without limits." The meaning of "without limits," however,
is different in each case. The infinite cannot be bounded because it is
infinite. The indefinite has no clear boundaries because its scope is so
heavily dependent on context, and not all possible future contexts can
be prescribed in advance. The indefinite has boundaries, but we do not
know precisely where they are. The infinite has no boundaries, and we
know this for certain.
Thus, the indefinite is unlimited, but not in the way that the infinite is. It makes perfect sense to say that an individual's responsibility
is "without limits" because it is always indefinite - that is, because
52. Id. at 621-32. In fact, Derrida asserts that, because de Man specifically distances himself
from so-called "vulgar" antisemitism, one can even read his article as implicitly rebuking the
more virulent examples of antisemitism in the pages of Le Soir. Id. at 625-26.
53. Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 820.
54. Id.
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the full contours of this responsibility can never be completely articulated - but it is nevertheless limited in another sense because it is not
infinite. Paul de Man's responsibility for his wartime journalism is
without limits because its scope cannot be fully demarcated: His actions will have had effects on individuals that he could not have foreseen. Moreover, his actions will continue to have effects about which
modern day judges of his responsibility do not and cannot know. In
this sense, Paul de Man indeed has a responsibility without limits. But
it is not an infinite responsibility. He is not responsible for the Holocaust, or the Lockerbie plane bombing, or the French Revolution.
We can also apply the distinction between the infinite and the indefinite to the meanings of texts. People often associate deconstruction with the claim that the meaning of texts is indeterminate. Yet
there are two ways to claim that meaning is indeterminate: One can
say that a text's meaning is infinite - that is, that it means everything
- or one can say that its meaning is indefinite. If the meaning of
every text is infinite, then all texts mean the same thing, because all
texts have every meaning. But if one says that the meaning of every
text is indefinite, we mean that the contexts in which the text will take
its meaning cannot be specified in advance, and therefore the text will
always have an excess of meaning over that which we expect (or intend) it to have when it is let loose upon the world. The first view of
texts is consistent with a nihilistic account of deconstruction; the second is consistent with the type of deconstruction I advocate.
The choice between these two approaches also corresponds to two
different explanations of how one deconstructs a conceptual opposition. The strategy of the nihilistic view is one of total effacement - all
conceptual distinctions are imaginary because the meanings of each
side of the opposition are infinite. Therefore both sides mean the same
thing. The strategy of transcendental deconstruction is one of nested
opposition. A nested opposition is an opposition in which the two sides
"contain" each other - that is, they possess a ground of commonality
as well as difference. 55 In this case, the deconstruction argues that the
two sides are alike in some contexts and different in others; the
logocentric mistake has been to assert categorically that they were
simply identical or simply different. Because the two sides form a
nested opposition, their similarity and their difference rely on context,
but because context cannot be fully determined in advance, the scope
of their similarity and difference is indefinite. In this way the transcendental conception of deconstruction preserves the possibility of
SS. For a fuller discussion, see J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990)
(book review).
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conceptual distinctions, while the nihilistic version does not. 56
The distinction between transcendental deconstruction and its unworkable alternative rests upon the distinction between the indefinite
and the infinite. However, since one can deconstruct any distinction,
one should also be able to deconstruct the distinction between the indefinite and the infinite. Even here, however, we need to ask what
conception of deconstruction we should use to critique the theory the transcendental or the nihilistic. If we use a nihilistic conception,
we would be effacing this distinction. We would say that there is no
difference between the indefinite and the infinite in any circumstance
or situation. So, for example, we would be saying that everything with
indefinite boundaries is infinite in extension. It would follow that each
day is infinite in length because the boundary between day and night is
indefinite. Thus, the use of nihilistic deconstruction leads to an untenable position, just as it leads to the destruction of many other useful
distinctions. But this is a reason to think that the nihilistic conception
of deconstruction is seriously flawed.
Instead, we might deconstruct the distinction between the indefinite and the infinite using the technique of transcendental deconstruction. To deconstruct a conceptual opposition is to show that the
conceptual opposition is a nested opposition - in other words, that
the two concepts bear relations of mutual dependence as well as mutual differentiation. 57 For example, we might discover that they have
elements in common, which become salient in some contexts, but that
in other contexts we note very important differences between them, so
that they are not the same in all respects. In fact, we would note that
the meaning of each depends in part on our ability to distinguish it
from the other in some contexts.
Thus, transcendental deconstruction, which relies on the indefi56. Note that even when deconstructive arguments are employed to efface a particular distinction, they do not necessarily efface the distinction in all contexts. Thus they should be distinguished from a strategy of total effacement. Take for example the distinction between writing
and speech discussed in DERRIDA, supra note 18. Derrida argues that speech and writing are
special cases of a more general form of "writing." He claims that people often assume that
speech is closer to truth or true meaning than writing, but this assumption is not necessarily
justified. Both possess the same features of signification, which are simply more obvious in the
case of writing. Derrida's argument uses deconstruction for purposes of rectification; it argues
that this new conception is a better - that is, truer - way of viewing things than the received
wisdom. It is not a strategy of total effacement because his argument does not in fact efface the
distinction between writing and speech in all contexts; it does so only with respect to the issue of
semiotic function. Writing is still written, and speech is still spoken; hence even after the deconstruction we cannot say that writing and speech are identical in all contexts of judgment. This is
a deconstructive argument of rectification; it shows not that speech and writing are identical, but
that there is a nested opposition between the two concepts. See Balkin, supra note 55, at 168993.
57. Id. at 1676.
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niteness rather than the effacement of all conceptual boundaries,
would insist that although we can offer relatively clear examples of
bounded but indefinite concepts - for example, between day and
night - we cannot demarcate in advance every example of the indefinite from every example of the infinite. Some of the things that we
currently think are indefinite may tum out, in a different context of
judgment, to be infinite and vice versa. We cannot know for sure because this distinction, like all others, is context dependent. Nevertheless, the very fact that this distinction is so heavily dependent upon
context means that we cannot say that the distinction is meaningless,
or that the terms collapse into each other. ss
B. Deconstruction and Reconstruction

We have seen that, if Derrida's arguments about responsibility are
to make sense, he must be cominitted to a transcendental conception
of deconstruction, whether or not he specifically recognizes this fact.
Moreover, the concept of an indefinite, rather than an infinite, responsibility better corresponds to the very important relationship of mutual
differentiation and dependence that must always exist between law and
justice. Laws apportion the comparative responsibility of parties. But
laws can never perform this apportionment perfectly. They can never
determine and assign completely the full responsibility of each and
every person, living or dead, in exactly the right amount. First, laws
must limit their concern to certain features of a situation and to certain effects that have already happened (or that can be proved in a
court of law to have happened). Second, laws can extend their reach
only to some parties, but not to all who might, in some larger sense, be
responsible - for example, those who escape judgment because they
are dead, out of the relevant jurisdiction, or bankrupt. Third, laws
must speak in general terms that must be applied to many different
58. I have argue(! that transcendental deconstruction is premised on the assumption of tran·
scendent values, and that this assumption inevitably leads to a logic of indefinite rather than
infinite meanings. We might be tempted to identify transcendent values with the infinite rather
than the indefinite because people sometimes think of the transcendent as that which surpasses
all others. However, the question of transcendent values really concerns the relationship between
general normative concepts like justice or beauty and their particular instantiations in the real
world. Our notion of justice is transcendent because no particular example of justice in the world
is perfectly just; it is indefinite because it cannot be reduced to any determinate formula. These
are two ways of describing the same phenomenon.
Nevertheless, our idea of justice is not infinite; it does not lack boundaries, even if these are
not fully determined. For example, the value of justice is not the same thing as the value of
beauty. If general normative concepts really had no limits, they would all be identical because
there would be no way to distinguish them from each other. So, although our transcendent
notion of justice is not specific enough to match any determinate example of justice or any deter·
minate formula of justice, it is specific enough to be distinguished from other normative concepts.
That is why it is indefinite but not infinite.
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factual contexts and therefore at best can fit each of these contexts like
a mass-produced suit fits a body - perhaps well enough in some circumstances to be presentable, but certainly not perfect in all respects.
Because responsibility is so deeply tied to context - both the contexts
which have already emerged and those which in the fullness of time
will emerge - human law must always, even in its best moments, be
merely a heuristic, a catch-as-catch-can solution to the problem of responsibility rather than a fully adequate solution. Thus, to speak of
the indefiniteness of human responsibility, and to speak of its failure to
be fully measured, apportioned, and captured by human laws and
human conventions, are really two ways of saying the same thing.
At the same time, our notion of justice can only be articulated and
enforced through human laws and conventions. We may have an idea
of justice that always escapes law and convention, but the only tools
we have to express and enforce our idea are human laws and human
conventions. In this sense our conception of the just relies for its articulation and enforcement on the imperfect law from which it must always be distinguished.
In sum, law is never perfectly just, but justice needs law to be articulated and enforced. This argument is exemplary of a transcendental approach to deconstruction, the only approach that can rescue
deconstruction from the nihilistic abyss of infinite meaning. It assumes that human values like justice transcend the positive norms of
human culture, even as they depend upon these norms for their articulation and expression. Human values like justice are always indeterminate; they must be constructed and articulated through culture, law,
and convention. Yet any articulation of human value never fully exhausts the scope of human evaluation. We may offer a theory of what
is just, and this theory may assist our judgments of what is just, but it
does not ever fully displace our sense of justice. We always retain the
ability to understand that our conventions, laws, and theories of justice fall short of our value of justice. Thus, our indeterminate values
continue to demand more from us than our articulations of them can
ever give; our urge to evaluate serves as a perpetual reminder of the
gap between our values and their articulations in law or convention.
Equally important, my argument assumes that it makes sense to
speak of the more just and the less just in a given context, even though
our sense of justice is always indeterminate and indefinite. It denies
that every conceptual articulation of justice is as good as any other, or
that every solution to the problem of justice is as good as any other. If
I claim that a human law only imperfectly captures the responsibility
of individuals, I must assume that there is another accounting of re-
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sponsibility that would be more just, even if I cannot describe a perfectly just solution. If I do not assume this, then my argument has no
critical import. If there is no more just solution, then either the solution which I criticize is the best possible solution - in which case I
have no reason to criticize it - or this solution is as good as any other
solution I might offer as an alternative - in which case there is no
reason to choose between them.
Thus, the transcendental conception of deconstruction is premised
on the possibility of an alternative reconstruction that is superior to the
given target of deconstruction. In this sense, deconstruction always
depends on reconstruction, even though this reconstruction may be
subject to further deconstructive critique. At the same time, theoretical (re)construction always depends on the tools of deconstruction. If
we wish to construct a just account of moral or legal responsibility, we
must be able to choose between competing alternatives and discard
those that prove unsatisfactory. However, to critique the various possibilities, and discover their hidden incoherences, we need the critical
tools of deconstruction. 5 9
A deconstructionist, Derrida included, can hardly avoid this analysis. Does he accept it? In his later writings, he seems to move toward it. Deconstruction, he argues, demands that we "constantly ...
maintain an interrogation of the origin, grounds and limits of our conceptual . . . apparatus surrounding justice. " 60 This demand does not
"neutraliz[e an] interest in justice" but "[o]n the contrary ... hyperbolically raises the stakes of exacting justice."61 Deconstruction requires a "sensitivity to a sort of essential disproportion" between
existing law or custom and justice. 62 The deconstructive attitude
"strives to denounce not only theoretical limits but also concrete injustices, with the most palpable effects, in the good conscience that dogmatically stops before any inherited determination of justice. " 63
Hence, Derrida connects the notion of limitless responsibility with
deconstruction's "engage[ment]" by an "infinite demand . . . for
justice. " 64
Yet the claim of an essential disproportion between law and justice
simply restates the point that there is an idea or value of justice that
59. For a fuller discussion of the relationship between deconstruction and reconstruction, see
Balkin, supra note 27, at 124-27.
60. Derrida, supra note 4, at 955.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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transcends any specific example of justice, whether embodied in law,
custom, or convention. Indeed, as Derrida later notes, "the deconstruction of all presumption of a determinant certitude of a present
justice itself operates on the basis of an infinite 'idea of justice.' " 65
This is perhaps the closest Derrida comes to the transcendental conception. He hesitates at this point because he does not wish "to assimilate too quickly this 'idea of justice' to a regulative idea (in the
Kantian sense), to a messianic promise or to other horizons of the
same type. " 66 Nevertheless, Derrida's hesitation is unnecessary, for
the deconstructive approach I advocate is not based on a fixed and
determinate Idea of justice, but an indeterminate and indefinite human
value. This value is the very sort of "demand" that Derrida identifies
with justice: an insatiable urge that is never fully realized in the products of human law, culture, and convention.

III.

SPEAKING IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE OTHER

Derrida's third formulation of the relation between deconstruction
and justice notes the etymological connections between justice and answering. To be just is to have responsibility, which is to respond to or
to answer for something. Thus, Derrida speaks of justice as an "infinite demand.'' 67 However, not any answer will do. Justice, Derrida
insists, requires one to address oneself to the Other in the language of
the Other: It requires us to forswear our own way of thinking, talking,
and looking at things in order to understand the Other in all of her
singularity and uniqueness. 68 This requirement is ultimately impossible to attain, and hence the infinite demand of justice can never fully
be satisfied.
Because justice demands that we address ourselves in the language
of the Other, the law can never be fully just. The problem for law,
Derrida argues, is threefold. First, law must speak in general terms,
and therefore it must simplify and falsify the situation at hand. 69
Legal understanding never allows us to understand situations or the
65. Id. at 965.
66. Id. By a "regulative idea," Kant meant an idea that we must postulate or employ as a
heuristic, in order to assist our use of reason. The self, the world, and God are examples of
regulative ideas. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 549-60 (Norman K.
Smith trans., London, MacMillan 1929) (1781).
67. Derrida, supra note 4, at 955. In discussing Derrida's arguments concerning justice I
shall follow his practice of speaking about the "demand" of justice, or about what justice "demands," to describe what is just or unjust. Nevertheless, I should note at the outset that this
familiar locution has the twin rhetorical effects of anthropomorphizing justice and downplaying
human subjectivity, as I describe more fully below. See infra text accompanying notes 136-37.
68. See Derrida, supra note 4, at 949.
69. See id.
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persons affected in all of their uniqueness. We must understand them
instead filtered through a set of legal categories, or classes of situations, that lump them together with many other equally heterogenous
and unique circumstances. The enforcement of the law according to
these categories is a form of simplification and falsification, and this
simplification and falsification are sources of injustice. 70
Second, as James Boyd White has recently noted, the problem of
justice is inherently a problem of translation. 71 For judges or other
parties to speak in the language of another, they must translate the
Other's language into their own. But translations are always imperfect. They never fully convey the sense of the original. Hence the very
necessity of translation renders it impossible fully to speak in the language of the Other. 72
Third, the requirement that law be impartial demands that we not
speak in the language of a particular party, but in a language that is
neutral and fair. 73 To speak in the language of only one of the parties
risks the danger of undue partiality toward that person, for the situation will be completely described in terms of her experience and her
concerns. This result is unfair because it may give short shrift to the
experience and concerns of other parties. Hence, law, which requires
fairness to all parties, must proceed in the language of neither one
party nor the other, but in a third language that attempts - even if it
does not always succeed - to be fair to both sides. Legal justice
strives for an impartiality that is also impersonal. Yet this solution
creates its own set of problems, for the neutral language of a third
party fails to speak in the language of either party, and hence it doubly
falsifies the situation by denying or obscuring the uniqueness and singularity of each side. 74
Derrida's ethics of Otherness contains two separate imperatives.
The first demands that we see a situation in all of its singularity. The
second demands that we attempt to see things from the Other's point
of view, using her vocabulary and her way of understanding the world.
To deal justly with each of these two points, we must not conflate
them, but rather deal with each separately - that is, respecting the
singularity and difference of each.
70. See id.
71. See JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 257-69 (1990).
72. See Derrida, supra note 4, at 949. This idea is related to a theme that Derrida borrows
from Heidegger and Levinas - the Other, because it is an Other, always remains ultimately
unreachable and unfathomable.
73. See id.
74. See id.; WHITE, supra note 71, at 262-63.
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A. Justice as the Recognition of Singularity

Derrida's demand that we see each situation in all its singularity is
ambiguous. We could interpret it either as a claim of absolute difference among situations or only as one of relative difference. A claim of
absolute difference means that we must see each situation as completely different from every other. A claim of relative difference means
that we must see each situation as different from any other 'in some
respects but not in others. Each situation is both different from and
similar to every other situation; its uniqueness consists in the fact that
this combination of similarity and difference manifests itself in different ways for each situation to which it is compared. Thus, A and B are
both similar to and different from C; but A and B are unique because
they are similar to and different from C in different ways.
We may state this distinction in another way. Consider three situations A, B, and C. They are all different. But are two of them more
alike than the third? There are two positions we can take. One argues
that all of them are absolutely different; consequently, no situation is
any more like another than any other situation. The alternative position would insist that we cannot answeJ.1 this question until we know
what context the questioner has in mind. Given a particular context
of decision, it will often be possible to say that two situations are more
like each other than either is to a third; but this judgment may shjft
radically if the context of judgment is sufficiently altered. If we are
concerned only with the question of weight, an elephant and a truck
are more alike than either is to an amoeba. Yet if the context of judg- ·
ment is shifted to the question of animate versus inanimate, the elephant and the amoeba are more alike than either is to the truck. This
alternative position asserts the relative similarity and difference of all
situations.
Does Derrida mean to suggest a theory of absolute difference or a
theory of relative difference? If justice is an "infinite demand," perhaps we must keep trying to view a situation as different from any
other in every respect. That would presume a theory of infinite difference. Yet, if Derrida means that justice requires us to assert the absolute difference of every situation, his claim is incoherent. It will be
impossible to decide any case, because no case can be compared to any
other. Because each case is completely different from all others, no
case is a better point of comparison than any other. We cannot apply
any consistent principle to different cases; hence, our judgment is
merely one of fiat, for no decision is any more principled or unprincipled than any other. Conversely, we might also say that a.II decisions
are equally principled. Because there are no relative degrees of com-
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parison, any judgment is as good an exemplar of our principles as any
other.
If Derrida's claim is based on a notion of relative difference, however, it accurately describes the predicament of just decisionmaking. 75
Each case is both similar to and different from every other, depending
on how we look at it. The difficulty of just decisionmaking lies precisely in deciding what is the appropriate context of judgment. The
question of principled consistency is the question of which cases our
case is most like and which cases it is least like, given the appropriate
context of judgment.
Consider the recent example of a seventeen-year-old high school
student who was sentenced by a judge in Thomaston, Georgia to three
years in prison for stealing an ice cream bar from the school cafeteria. 76 The judge defended his decision on the grounds that the case
was a burglary, and the penalty for burglary was three years. He argued that the appropriate context of judgment involved the definition
of burglary, the legislature's decision to fix the age of majority at seventeen, and his county's practice of uniform punishments for all violators of the same crime. His judgment was criticized on two grounds,
each of which offered a competing context of judgment. First, what
the student did was more like a schoolboy prank than a professional.
breaking and entering. Second, on the same day the student was sentenced to· three years, the judge gave suspended sentences and fines to
several people convicted of drug possession and drunk driving. 77
We can only criticize the judge's decision if we assume the relative
difference of situations - that is, only if we argue that this situation is
both different from and similar to others. In order to differentiate this
case from an "ordinary" case of burglary, we must be able to say that
this defendant was a student like other students, that his action was a
prank like other schoolyard pranks. In order to argue that it is unfair
that drug users and drunk drivers should receive a lesser penalty, we
must be able to assess comparative degrees of responsibility and harm
between situations. Yet this means that we must already be able to see
these situations as similar in some respects; this similarity is necessary
for them to be comparable or commensurable according to some com75. This interpretation seems most consistent with his criticisms of Levinas. See, e.g.,
DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 53-55, 68-72, 83-85 (1992); JACQUES
DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 126-28 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1978)
(1967); Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial ofKlaus Barbie,
98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1376 (1989).
76. Christopher Sullivan, Small Town Ponders Prison for Snickers Theft, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Sept. 19, 1993, at AlO.
77. Id.
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mon metric. We cannot compare these situations if we assume that
each is unique in the sense of absolutely different. We can only make
such a judgment if we see each situation as relatively.different. Thus,
justice may require that we understand each situation in its uniqueness, but, ironically, this requires that we treat it like the situations
that are most similar to it in the appropriate context of judgment. To
recognize its uniqueness, we must also recognize its similarity to other
situations.
The same criterion of relative difference applies when we seek a
just understanding of persons who are different from us. It is important to try to understand and respect people who are different from us.
To understand and respect their difference, however, we must first understand their similarity to us. We must try to see how their concerns
and values are really similar to our concerns and our values, and thus,
how the situation they find themselves in and their reactions to that
situation make sense. At the same time, to grasp this similarity, to put
ourselves in other people's shoes, we must recognize how our lives and
theirs are different. That is why every attempt at understanding is a
simultaneous assertion of commonality with and difference from the
Other. If we unthinkingly assume that the Other is too much like us,
we will never understand her actions when they diverge from our own;
if we insist on our absolute difference from her, she will never be able
to understand us.
The competing interpretations of absolute and relative difference
offer two different accounts of the predicament of judging. The theory
of absolute difference suggests. that just judging is 'impossible because
no situation is really like any other. All principled decisionmaking is
completely indeterminate because we have no way of comparing situations when each is absolutely different. On the other hand, the theory
of relative difference argues that doing justice is difficult because there
are so many ways to see situations as similar as well as different. The
problem is not that no two situations are ever similar; it is that there
are too many ways in which situations are similar to each other, and
we must try to parse out the right ways to assess this similarity. In
other words, the secret of judging lies in determining the appropriate
context of judgment. However, we can never fully determine the present context, and we can never fully know of the presence or absence of
other events that might significantly alter the context of our judgment
when we decide a case. Therefore we are always uncertain - at least
to some degree - about the justice of our decision.
Note that the dependence of justice on context is much like the
dependence of meaning on context. The indeterminacy of meaning
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and the uncertainty of judgment are both based on the indefiniteness
of context. This view is consistent with the transcendental approach
to deconstruction. In contrast, an approach that asserts the infinite
difference of each situation is just the flip side of an approach that
asserts that meaning is infinite. The former asserts the absolute
difference of all situations and all people, while the latter asserts the
absolute identity of all meanings. Both approaches lead to normative
nihilism and a failure of understanding. As before, Derrida's
arguments only make sense if his is a transcendental account of
deconstruction.
B. Justice as Understanding the Other's Point of View
Derrida's ethics of Otherness has a second component: It employs
a different sense of individuality and uniqueness. Under this view, justice requires one to speak in the language of the Other by trying to see
things from the Other's point of view. 78 This conception of justice
seems most attractive when we are the injurer or the stronger party in
a relationship, or when we are in the position of a judge who is attempting to arbitrate between competing claims. For example, suppose that we are the State, the stronger party, the oppressor, or the
injurer, or suppose that we are contemplating an action that might put
us in such a position. It seems only just that we should try to understand how we have injured or oppressed the Other (or might be in a
position to injure or oppress). We can only do this if we try to see the
problem from the Other's perspective and understand her pain and her
predicament in all of its uniqueness. The duty we owe to the Other is
the duty to see how our actions may affect or have affected the Other;
to fulfill this duty we must put away our own preconceptions and vocabulary and try to see things from her point of view. Similarly, if we
are a judge in a case attempting to arbitrate between the parties, the
ethics of Otherness demands that we try to understand how our decision will affect the two parties, and this will require us to see the matter from their perspective.
Suppose, however, that we are not the injurer, but the victim; not
the State, but the individual; not the strong, but the weak; not the
oppressor, but the oppressed. Does justice require that we speak in the
language of the person we believe is injuring or oppressing us? Must a
rape victim attempt to understand her violation from the rapist's point
of view? Does justice demand that she attempt to speak to the rapist
in his own language - one which has treated her as less than human?
78. See Derrida, supra note 4, at 949.
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Must a concentration camp survivor address her former captor in the
language of his worldview of Aryan supremacy? We might wonder
whether this is what justice really requires, especially if the injustice
we complain of is precisely that the Other failed to recognize us as a
person, refused to speak in our language, and declined to consider our
uniqueness and authenticity.
When we move from Derrida's grand pronouncements on the ethics of the Other to the place "where he lives," to his writings on Paul
de Man, we see this pleasant formula properly deconstructed. Derrida
both adopts and rejects the formula in different contexts. For example, Derrida applies the formula when he demands that his critics read
both him and de Man fairly. His first rule of just interpretation is
"respect for the other, that is, for his right to difference, in his relation
to others but also in his relation to himself."79 To judge de Man fairly,
one must speak to de Man in his own language and read him in the
proper context.
Thus, Derrida insists that we evaluate de Man through the ethics
of the Other. But what is the proper attitude to take toward de Man's
critics? Derrida argues that he faces a serious problem: These critics
cannot or will not read what he and de Man say; he describes them
through the neologism ne pveulent pas lire - they can't/won't read. 80
These critics have failed the call of justice; they have not been open to
the Other - de Man and Derrida. 81 What does justice demand of
Derrida in defense of de Man? Here Derrida's practice deconstructs
his theory: The essay Biodegradables cannot be described as anything
other than a polemic. Derrida is perfectly aware of this but considers
it unavoidable:
I have never in my life taken the initiative of a polemic. Three or four
times, and always in response, and always because I was invited to do so, I
have simply tried to confront some manipulations that were too serious
to ignore....
Of those who might regret the harshness or the high-handedness of
certain of my remarks, right here, I ask - isn't it only fair? - to reread
79. Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8, at 644.
80. Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at. 823. Derrida combines the "p" in pouvoir (can)
and the "v" in vouloir (want) to create the expression ''je ne pveux pas lire (I can/will not read)."
Id. at 828; see also id. at 827, 843.
81. Indeed, so egregious is their practice of reading that at one point Derrida wonders
whether they can even be considered to be morally responsible for their actions. Id. at 823.
Because the category of ne pveut pas lire "displaces the category of responsibility," Derrida insists that he is not passing judgment on his critics: "Moreover, I bear these five no ill will; I have
nothing against them; I would even like (if only in order to avoid this spectacle) to help them free
themselves from this frightened, painful, and truly excessive hatred." Id. However, given the
tone of the rest of the article, one might be pardoned if one were tempted to take these protestations of good will at less than face value.
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one more time the critical responses. Then they will have a better measure of the aggression - its violence and its mediocrity - that has me as
its victim . . . . It is not possible for me to respond on that level. And it
is my duty not to accept it. One does not always decide by oneself on a
high-handed tone. 82

Justice, it seems, does not always demand that one speak in the
language of the Other, especially when the Other is not playing by the
same rules. 83 Jesus might have advised his followers to tum the other
cheek and to love their enemies, but this approach is not necessarily
what justice requires or a particularly good strategy for achieving a
just result. Not all encounters with an Other will involve willing participants in an open dialogue. Nevertheless, justice demands that the
oppressor answer for her wrong, whether or not she admits her fault.
Even if she makes no answer to her victim, she must answer for her
crime. Justice demands satisfaction, even (and especially) if the miscreant is unwilling to provide satisfaction. The answer that an oppressive Other must provide to an oppressed Other - for example, a
prison sentence or a money judgment - is not necessarily addressed
to the victim in her language. It is not necessarily even understood by
the injurer as an answer to the victim, or as an attempt to understand
the victim in all of her singularity. Sometimes justice makes its demand precisely when people will not understand each other, when
they will not treat others as equals.
Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, justice demands that we deal with
people and things not in a self-abnegating manner, but in the manner
app:i;opriate to the situation before us. Centuries ago, Confucius argued that the virtuous man is one who knows both how to love people
to the extent they are deserving of love, and to hate people to the extent that they are deserving of hate. 84 Justice demands that we speak
in the language of the Other to the extent that it is appropriate to do so
because this would further justice, but it equally demands that we not
do so when it would increase injustice.
82. Id. at 872.
83. Indeed, Derrida insists, one does not even have to respond at all to accusations that are
fundamentally unfair or disrespectful:
Is it necessary to respond to every interpellation. to everyone no matter who, to every
question, and especially to every public attack? The answer is "yes," it seems, when time
and energy permit, to the extent to which the response keeps open, in spite of everything, a
space of discussion. Without such a space no democracy and no community deserving of
the name would survive. But the answer is "no" if the said interpellations fail to respect
certain elementary rules, if they so lack decency or interest that the response risks shoring
them up with a guarantee, confirming in some way a perversion of the said democratic
discussion. Yet, in that case, it would be necessary that the nonresponse be appropriately
interpreted as a sign of respect for certain principles and not as contempt for the questioner.
Id. at 837.
84. CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS 4:3 (D.C. Lau trans., Chinese Univ. Press 1983) (1979).
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We may connect this point to our earlier criticism of the notion of
a "responsibility without limits." Derrida has argued that the ethics
of Otherness imposes upon us a responsibility to speak in the language
of the Other. However, because justice is a responsibility without limits, we might ask as before whether this responsibility to the Other is
an infinite responsibility or merely an indefinite one.
Thus, there are two different interpretations of the ethics of Otherness. The first imposes an infinite duty; the second imposes only an
indefinite duty. The first corresponds to a nihilistic conception of
deconstruction; the second to the transcendental conception. The requirement of an infinite duty means that we must in every case use all
the available means at our disposal to speak in the language of the
Other; the requirement of an indefinite duty means we must make
some attempt to speak in the language of the Other, and that the
boundaries of our duty are uncertain and contextually driven. In the
first case, the demand of justice is never satisfied because this demand
is infinite; in the second case, we can never be certain that the demand
of justice is satisfied because the duty it imposes is indefinite.
All of the difficulties with the ethics of Otherness arise from the
assumption that our responsibility to speak in the language of the
Other is infinite. We can restate the difficulty by relating it to a similar
problem in understanding the views of another. This is the problem of
hermeneutic charity. When we try to understand what another person
means, we usually do so by trying to envision how what they are saying makes sense. As Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued, we must make
an "anticipation of completion" that what another is saying is coherent and has a claim to truth. 85 A stance of openness and interpretive
charity is actually essential to the process of understanding. If we do
not take this stance, we cannot be sure that our discovery of incoherence or falsity in another's position is due to a defect in their argument
or our inability to understand it fully. 8 6
In other words, when attempting to understand another person,
especially a person with a different world view from our own, we must
be open to the possibility that the truth is more on their side than ours,
that what they are saying is really true and valid - indeed, more true
and valid than our own beliefs. Thus, we must be open to the possibility that our encounter with the Other will change our own views about
what is true and good. 87 Understanding, then, is a kind of vulnerabil85. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 261-62 (Garrett Barden & John Cumming eds. & Sheed & Ward Ltd. trans., Seabury Press 1975) (1960).
86. See id. at 263.
87. Cf. id. at 262.
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ity or openness to the truth that the Other may have to express. 88 It
always requires the possibility that our beliefs will be changed through
our encounter with the Other. Indeed, Gadamer argues, if we do not
come to our encounter with this hermeneutic openness, we can never
achieve real understanding; at most we achieve a halfway measure, in
which we withhold ourselves from true understanding because we
withhold ourselves from the necessary hermeneutic vulnerability. 89
The duty of hermeneutic charity in Gadamer's theory of interpretation strongly resembles Derrida's version of the ethics of Otherness.
Given the common influence of Heidegger on both thinkers, this commonality should not be surprising. Yet Gadamer's duty of interpretive
charity and openness to the object of interpretation raises a serious
difficulty. If this duty is endless, it is hard to distinguish this duty
from a duty to reach an agreement with the person we are trying to
understand. We do not know, in other words, at what point we should
cease our efforts to see the truth in the views of the other party and
simply recognize that they are wrong or that their argument is incoherent. If we go too far, we risk the danger of what I call hermeneutic
cooptation. 90 By repeatedly blaming the incoherence or wrongness of
the argument of another solely on our insufficient failure to understand it, we place all the responsibility for intellectual change upon
ourselves. There is the danger that our drive to understand the truth
in the other person's views will lead us to be coopted by those views
and brought into agreement with things we should not agree with, because they are false, misleading, or unjust. 91
There is a further difficulty. If the Other's views treat us as objects
or as persons who deserve no respect, the requirement of continual
hermeneutic charity will require us to adopt ways of thinking and talking that are unjust to ourselves. That is why we hesitate to think that
justice requires that a political prisoner strive to speak in the language
of her former torturers, or that a Holocaust survivor attempt to understand her own situation in the language of Aryan supremacy. To require this sort of understanding is to require these people to injure
themselves psychically through the duty of understanding. For want
of a better name, let us call this the requirement of hermeneutic masochism. True justice toward another should never involve hermeneutic cooptation, and it should never require hermeneutic masochism.
An infinite responsibility to speak in the language of the Other ere88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 262.
Id. at 270.
See Balkin, supra note 27, at 163.
Id. at 160-61, 167-69.
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ates the perpetual danger of hermeneutic cooptation and hermeneutic
masochism. It leads to the ridiculous spectacle of the rape victim being asked to understand that, in the eyes of her attacker, she was really
just an object for subordination and conquest. It leads to the conclusion that blacks should be more understanding when white police officers automatically assume that they are likely to be criminals. 92 An
infinite responsibility to speak in the language of the Other can easily
lead to perpetual justification of the Other, no matter how unreasonable their position. This is not what justice requires.
The postulation of an infinite duty is untenable. Yet we might still
make sense of the ethics of Otherness by viewing the duty to understand as indefinite rather than infinite. We have some duty to speak in
the language of the Other, but our duty is not infinite. Instead, justice
demands that we make just the right amount of effort to understand
the Other. Beyond that point, it is not only appropriate but necessary
for us to recognize that the Other's views are incoherent or unjustified,
and that our own position is more reasonable. We have a duty to be
open to and absorb that part of the Other's point of view which furthers justice while disagreeing with the rest.
But if we have this responsibility, how will we know when to cease
our efforts at understanding? How will we know when we have done
all that justice requires? We cannot know the full contours of our
responsibility in advance of our encounter with the Other. Each situation will be different, and our responsibility in each situation will
depend heavily on the context of the encounter. Hence our responsibility to the Other, while not infinite, is nevertheless indefinite.
There is a further reason why our duty to the Other must be indefinite. It has to do with the symmetrical nature of Otherness. 93 We are
always an Other to the person who is an Other to us. The ethics of
Otherness seems most appealing when we sympathize with the Other
because the Other is the oppressed, the victim, or a potential object of
injustice. However, we cannot state as a general rule that only the
oppressor needs to speak in the language of the oppressed, or the injurer in the language of the victim. An additional problem of indefiniteness arises because these categories are not always clearly defined.
In different contexts, and from different perspectives, different people
appear to be strong or weak, injurer or victim, oppressor or oppressed,
judge or judged.
First, the roles of the two parties may shift radically depending on
92. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 46, 58-79 (1991).
93. See CORNELL, supra note 75, at 54; DERRIDA, supra note 75, at 128.
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how one describes the situation. Consider two neighbors who make
conflicting uses of their property. Suppose that Neighbor One needs
to operate machinery to run her business while Neighbor Two needs
peace and quiet for her health. The second neighbor regards the first
neighbor as an injurer; Neighbor One should try to understand how
important it is for Neighbor Two to have peace and quiet. But Neighbor One has a symmetrical complaint. If she has to stop operating her
machine, she will go out of business. Neighbor Two's demand is unreasonable under the circumstances, and justice requires that Neighbor Two understand the significant costs her request will impose on
Neighbor One. 94 In this situation each party is an Other to the other,
and each is an Other to the judge who must decide the case. Thus
there are at least four different potential duties to respond. Both
neighbors must make some effort to understand the position of the
Other, but the roles of oppressor and oppressed, victim and injurer,
are not determined in advance. Similarly, the judge must attempt to
understand the situation of each neighbor from each neighbor's perspective, but the extent of this duty depends on which neighbor is acting unjustly toward the other, and this is the very question that the
judge must decide.
Thus, the scope of the duty owed to speak in the language of the
Other depends on our definition of the roles of the parties - as victim
or injurer, strong or weak - but this definition will in turn be affected
by the scope of the duty to speak in the language of the Other. For
example, the more we try to see things from Neighbor One's perspective, the clearer it may become that Neighbor Two is being unreasonable, oppressive, and playing the role of the potential injurer. Yet the
opposite conclusion might follow if we attempt to see the situation
from Neighbor Two's perspective. The scope of our duty to speak in
the language of the Other does not exist before we decide what their
respective roles are, but the roles each plays cannot fully be determined before we fix the scope of the duty; each feature of the situation
provides the proper context in which the other feature is to be judged.
Because of the mutual dependence and differentiation of these contexts, the scope of the duty toward the Other is indefinite. It is neither
infinite nor nonexistent, but dependent on facts and circumstances
that are never fully clear, and whose precise contours we cannot fully
determine .in advance. Thus, the duty to speak in the language of the
Other becomes a duty without limits, but it is by no means an infinite
duty as Derrida suggests.
94. This example draws on the familiar Coasean point that both parties are causal factors in
their conflicting use. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2 (1960).
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The difficulty that produces indefiniteness may be subdivided into
two problems: Let us call them the problem of certainty and the problem of proportion or degree. The problem of certainty arises when we
cannot be sure whether a person is in fact an oppressor or an oppressed person. Justice may require us to decide this question, rather
than use it as a basis for determining just action. Suppose a criminal
defendant is accused of rape. If he really raped the victim, he is an
oppressor. Justice demands that he recognize how he has harmed his
victim and answer for his crime. If he is innocent, however, he will be
oppressed if the State fails to do justice to him. The State must therefore ensure that it hears his story and understands the situation from
his point of view; it must make sure that it does not convict him based
on false evidence or unreasoning stereotypes. At the same time, it
must not unthinkingly accept every piece of exculpatory evidence and
every exculpatory account the defendant might offer, for that might
create an equal and opposite injustice. In a criminal case we cannot
determine in advance whether a person is guilty or innocent; that is
precisely the purpose of a criminal trial. Given this situation, does
justice demand that we speak to the defendant in his language or that
he speak to us in our own? Our uncertainty in this regard leads to the
indefiniteness of the duty.
The problem of degree arises because a person may at one and the
same time be an injurer or oppressor to some degree and a victim or an
oppressed person to another degree. Suppose that we are quite sure
that a criminal defendant is guilty of rape. He nevertheless deserves to
be treated with some respect; for example, the State should not be
permitted to torture him to extract a confession, and it must give him
an opportunity to defend himself in court. His crime may be less bad
than other crimes of the same sort; if so, justice requires that he be
given a chance to produce exculpatory evidence, and the State has a
duty to consider it and lessen his sentence to the appropriate extent. If
the State fails to protect the defendant's rights, he may be in the position of an oppressed party, despite his horrible crime. Thus, the State
has a duty to speak in his language with respect to some features of the
situation, but not with respect to others. These complications also
produce an indefinite duty.
The case of Paul de Man is a perfect example of the indefiniteness
of our duty toward the Other. The entire debate surrounding de Man
concerns what role he should be assigned. Is de Man a victim of unjust accusation or a person who unjustly accused others (Jews)? Was
he a collaborator, an ambitious man without a moral compass who
sought to forget his sordid past, or was he an immature youth who
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made an early mistake yet matured into a respected scholar? The
question of his status is inextricable from the question of what it
means to be fair to him. Moreover, even if de Man willingly wrote
antisemitic literature, justice requires that he be condemned only to
the extent that he is responsible, but not to the extent that he is not
responsible. In order to be fair to de Man, we must try to understand
what he did and wrote, and this endeavor may require us to understand how he understood his actions and his writings. Nevertheless,
we do not have to accept everything he said or did at face value or
interpret every one of hi~ writings or actions so as to exculpate him,
just as we should not deliberately interpret his life in its worst possible
light. Our duty of fairness is indefinite, but not infinite in either direction - toward exculpation or inculpation. We can be unjust either by
refusing to speak in the language of the Other or by exclusively adopting that tongue.
Note that we cannot avoid these difficulties by insisting that all
parties, whether victim or injurer, oppressor or oppressed, have an
equal and infinite duty to speak in the language of the Other. An
equal and infinite duty on all sides leads to either incoherence or injustice. It means that the rapist and the rape victim have equal duties to
understand each other in terms of each other's conception of each
other, and this requirement permits neither a determinable decision
nor a just one. Justice demands that each "speak in the language of
the Other" to the proper amount, to the proper degree, and in the
proper circumstances. This duty is without limits not because it is
infinite but because it is indefinite - because the question of duty to
the Other is bound up with the very description of the situation which
the duty concerns.
An indefinite duty, like an indefinite responsibility, is "without
limits" because its contours are context boun:d and because this context cannot be fully determined in advance. What would an indefinite
duty toward the Other mean? It would be a duty that can never fully
be satisfied. However, it cannot be satisfied because we are uncertain
about its scope, not because the demand is infinite. 95
95. We should not confuse the question whether our responsibility to the Other is infinite or
indefinite with still another reason why the demand of justice may remain unsatisfied in a particular case: the impossibility of a commensurable remedy. Often subsequent reparations for an
injury never seem adequate to compensate for a previous loss. But this impossibility is not be·
cause either the loss or the responsibility for the loss is infinite, in the sense of having a limitless
magnitude. Rather, the problem is one of incommensurability between the loss and any remedy
we could offer. This incommensurability arises from the fact that our lives change in response to
the events that happen to us. Our situation after an injury cannot be made fully commensurable
with the situation before because both we and the world around us have changed as a result and
can never be the same again. The past, precisely because it is past, can never fully be redeemed.
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Previously we identified the concept of an infinite responsibility
with normative nihilism. The notion of an infinite duty to speak in the
language of the Other - which is a total abandonment of ourselves to
the language of the Other - also leads to a kind of nihilism. Hoping
to efface the distinction between self and Other, we succeed only in
effacing the self and its language, just as the effacement of all distinctions leads to the destruction of meaning. This endeavor leads to a
"nihilism of the self." The preservation of the self is the preservation
of its Otherness from the Other, which is also the preservation of its
partial similarity to the Other, and a source of the indefiniteness of its
duty toward the Other. When we understand deconstruction to require an indefinite obligation, we preserve the self and make sense of
the demand of justice; but when we understand deconstruction to require an infinite demand, it must lead to effacement or nihilism.
IV.

DECONSTRUCTION AS AN "ANTITOTALITARIAN"
FORM OF ANALYSIS

Derrida's final suggestion connects deconstruction to an opposition
to totalitarianism in thought. Derrida insists that what he has always
practiced under the name of deconstruction "has always seemed to me
favorable, indeed destined (it is no doubt my principal motivation) to
the analysis of ... totalitarianism in all its forms, which cannot always
be reduced to names of regimes."96 He finds examples of totalitarian
thinking in criticisms of Paul de Man; since these critics are so concerned with denouncing political totalitarianism, he argues, they
should avoid reproducing the logic of totalitarianism in their judgments and readings. 97 In fact, deconstructive analysis, which they attack, is the best way to avoid totalitarian logic: "[D]econstructions
have always represented ... the at least necessary condition for identifying and combating the totalitarian risk" in discourse. 98
What is a "totalitarian" logic of discourse or a "totalitarian" gesThe nature and direction of our lives have been irrevocably altered by previous actions and
events; we become different people because of what has happened to us.
Thus, if the defendant accidentally breaks the plaintiff's leg, she may be deeply sorry for what
she has done. Yet her action has affected the lives of others in a way that cannot fully be repaired, no matter what good deeds she later performs, and no matter how much assistance she
offers to the victim and the victim's family. In such circumstances, the reason why the injurer's
responsibility can never be fully satisfied is not because it is infinite in magnitude. The problem is
that any remedy we could offer will be of the wrong kind, because we cannot relive the past.
Thus, the fact that we live our lives in unidirectional time by itself can make subsequent remedies
for finite harms incommensurable and hence essentially and perpetually inadequate.
96. Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8, at 648.
97. Id. at 645.
98. Id. at 647.
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ture in discourse? Derrida seems to identify it with various forms of
oversimplification, falsification, or rushing to judgment. His examples
describe features that he finds objectionable in various critical readings
of de Man's work:
purification, purge, totalization, reappropriation, homogenization, rapid
objectification, good conscience, stereotyping and nonreading, immediate politicization or depoliticization (the two always go together), immediate historicization or dehistoricization (it is always the same thing),
immediate ideologizing moralization (immorality itself) of all the texts
and all the problems, expedited trial, condemnations, or acquittals, summary executions or sublimations. This is what must be deconstructed. 99

All of these sins of reading and understanding share an inattention
- whether willful or innocent - to problems of context. They oversimplify by failing to spend the time or effort to see the multifaceted
and complicated textures of meaning that attend any text or any
event. 100 The totalitarian gesture, then, is oversimplification and inattention to complexity and context; the antitotalitarian gesture, which
is just, is a corresponding attention to these features of texts.
Of course, a judgment whether one is being insufficiently sensitive
to context is itself a contextual judgment. For example, in some contexts, dismissing another's arguments, making categorical distinctions,
and even rushing to judgment may not be an entirely bad practice. 101
Derrida denies that "we have access to a complete formalization of
this [totalitarian] logic" or can be absolutely exterior to it. 102 There is
no "systematic set of themes, concepts, philosophemes, forms of utterance, axioms, evaluations, hierarchies which, forming a closed and
identifiable coherence of what we call totalitarianism, fascism, nazism,
racism, antisemitism, never appear outside these formations and especially never on the opposite side." 103 Indeed, there is no "systematic
coherence proper to each of them, since one must not confuse them
too quickly with each other." 104 Conversely, there is no discursive act
which is completely antitotalitarian, for there is no "property so closed
and so pure that one may not find any element of these systems in
discourses that are commonly opposed to them." 105
Derrida's identification of deconstructive argument with antitotal99. Id. at 646.
100. Id. at 645.

101. For example, Derrida himself thinks it important to condemn Nazism and political
totalitarianism in all of their forms. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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itarianism is really a special case of his critique of logocentrism. The
problem oflogocentrism is the problem of categorical judgment. Categorical judgments are judgments that employ categories; whenever we
predicate a property of an object, we place it in a category. We say
that it is this way rather than that, that it goes into this box rather
than another. In fact, categorical judgments are necessary to our
thought; they are the basis of all judgments of similarity and difference. Of course the term categorical has another meaning as well insensitivity to context. Categorical obligations are unconditional; to
state something categorically is to assert it without regard to (at least
some types of) context. Thus, categorical judgments, because they are
categorical, are to some degree acontextual. They must lump some
things together as similar and exclude others as different, without attending to the similarities across, or the differences within, the boundaries that they establish. Hence every categorical judgment is a sort of
falsification or oversimplification of the situation. Of course that is
precisely why categories are useful. In a world of infinite diversity,
change, and differentiation, categories gather things together and treat
them as similar so that the human mind can understand the world
before it. One might think of categories, then, as heuristics that aid
understanding through partial simplification. 106
What is most remarkable about categorical judgment, then, is that
it is simultaneously useful, adequate, and empowering in some contexts and deficient, inadequate, and misleading in others. We cannot
do without categorical judgments of some type, yet if we do not pay
sufficient attention to the context in which we make them, they may
lead us away from what is true and what is just. Deconstruction helps
us to recognize the discrepancy between the categorical judgments we
make and the context our judgment overlooks. A perfectly just treatment of a situation would require us to understand the situation in all
of its contextual richness. 107 Nevertheless, we must make categorical
judgments of some type to articulate the very context we seek to uncover. Context itself must be describable in terms that are unavoidably categorical. Hence the process of deconstructive analysis, while
106. Although this sort of argument is generally associated with conceptual relativism, we
should note that it is perfectly consistent with a realist ontology. One might believe that linguistic categories lump together objects that are really similar in some respects, although different in
others, and that the grounds of this similarity and difference are not simply a matter of human
convention.
107. Thus, Derrida insists, "one must analyze as far as possible this process of formalization
and its program so as to uncover the statements, the philosophical, ideological, or political behaviors that derive from it and wherever they-may be found." Derrida, Paul de Man's War,
supra note 8, at 646.
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"urgent," is also "interminable." 108 Deconstruction becomes "the
tireless analysis (both theoretical and practical) of ... adherences" 109
to the totalitarian discourses that remain lodged even in one's own
ways of thinking and which one is trying to combat.
Indeed, in articulating his point, Derrida falls prey to the very danger he warns against. Derrida labels all the various forms of oversimplification and acontextual judgment as "totalitarian." 110 But this
comparison is itself a gross overstatement and highly misleading. To
be sure, totalitarian regimes may make use of simplistic slogans and
lump various persons together into categories of undesirables, but it
hardly follows that every oversimplification deserves the name "totalitarian," especially given the powerful connotations that usually accompany this word. In Derrida's terms this comparison is in itself an
oversimplification, a "totalitarian" move that provides Derrida's attack on de Man's critics with much more rhetorical force than it really
deserves. It would be more appropriate - and more just - to argue
that these critics do not read de Man in the proper context and with
the proper degree of charity; but this accusation, even if true, in no
way justifies the claim that, in misreading de Man, they are reproducing the logic of totalitarian discourse.
In fact, when we strip away its more obfuscating elements, Derrida's identification of deconstruction with antitotalitarianism is really
better expressed in terms of deconstruction's continual allegiance to
transcendental human values, which law, language, and convention
never fully serve and always partially obscure. We deconstruct categorical judgments because they take us further away from truth; we
deconstruct legal categories because they deviate from what is just.
Nevertheless, a deconstruction in the service of justice is always premised on the possibility of reconstruction - that is, on the hope of
some categorical scheme that would better articulate the appropriate
context of judgment. If we do not believe that there is a better description, there is no point in deconstructing in the first place. We are simply substituting one description for another, without any assertion that
one is better than another.
Does this practice in fact presuppose a transcendental norm of justice? We might deconstruct only in order to show that a categorical
judgment fails to live up to the norms of our particular culture or legal
108. Id.
109. Id. at 648.
110. See id. at 645 ("Such a formalizing, saturating totalization seems to me to be precisely
the essential character of this logic whose project, at least, and whose ethico-political conse·
quence can be terrifying.").
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system. In that case the ultimate ground of our deconstruction is to
obtain increasing fidelity to positive norms. However, such a practice
places the positive norms beyond criticism because they are the basis
of deconstructive critique. Yet one can easily imagine cases in which
this very refusal to critique positive norms would itself be totalitarian.
However, to say that positive norms are inadequate - and hence
in order to deconstruct them - we must refer to values that lie beyond the norms we are critiquing and that serve as the source of our
criticism, even if we believe that the values we wish to uphold are to
some extent realized in our culture. Suppose that we denied that we
need concern ourselves with transcendental values: Suppose we assert
that we are only interested in engaging in an "immanent" critique. In
other words, we say that we are using one aspect of our cultural norms
to critique other aspects, and therefore we need make no reference to
anything beyond the positive norms of our culture. For example, we
might use the commitment to equality expressed in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964111 to criticize the lack of civil rights for homosexuals in
the United States. The question remains, however, why we saw a particular aspect of our cultural practices as a worthy basis for our critique and another aspect as unworthy. Since both are equally aspects
of our culture, culture by itself cannot serve as a norm to decide between them.
We might say that one is a more central feature of our cultural
norms than the other, but this leads to two different interpretations. If
something is central because it is more prevalent, we refer only to a
positive norm. Yet mere prevalence does not guarantee th~ worth of a
cultural practice, unless our only goal is to reinforce positive norms for
their own sake. For example, racial inequality may be central to a
regime of Jim Crow or apartheid, but this fact does not make it a
worthy basis for a critique of egalitarian norms that might exist elsewhere in the culture. Indeed, by reinforcing the most prevalent practices of a culture, we may reinforce its most deeply unfair elements.
On the other hand, by "central" we could mean "more valuable" or
"more just." In that case our judgment must also refer to a transcendent conception of value. or justice that informs our notion of centrality. Thus, whenever we speak of the proper continuation of positive
norms or about deciding between alternative interpretations of positive
norms, we must eventually make use of transcendental norms of justice. Although we may find these norms partially realized in portions
111. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a
to 2000h-6 (1988)).
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of our own culture, these inadequate articulations do not exhaust their
meaning for us.
V.

DECONSTRUCTION AS A NORMATIVE CHASM

I want to conclude this essay by juxtaposing two different claims. I
began this essay by noting that the normative import of any particular
deconstructive argument depends largely upon what the deconstructor
chooses to deconstruct, and the values and commitments that she
brings to her act of deconstruction. As we have seen, 112 Derrida tends
to pick targets for deconstruction that correspond to the injustices he
perceives. He deconstructs inegalitarian conceptions, but not egalitarian ones; he deconstructs the cultural practice of apartheid and Western practices that support it, but not arguments against apartheid; he
deconstructs unfair accusations of Paul de Man, but not those assessments which he believes to be fair. At the same time, I have argued
for a transcendental version of deconstruction: When we employ
deconstruction to discuss questions of justice, we always refer to the
discrepancy between human law, culture, and convention, and the
human values which they articulate.
When we put these two claims together, we arrive at a curious
problem. If deconstruction makes reference to transcendental values,
why should the results of deconstructive argument tum on the target
of our deconstruction? How is it possible that deconstructive arguments can be wielded for contrary purposes? Why isn't deconstructive
argument always a force for good?
In the three essays I have discussed, Derrida does not deal adequately with the many difficult questions concerning the ethics of
deconstructive argument. He is preoccupied with showing that deconstruction is not necessarily nihilistic. 113 Nevertheless, he never offers
much of an argument for why deconstructive argument cannot lead to
contradictory normative positions or even be used to promote injustice. In Biodegradables, he does little more than scoff at the notion
that one can use deconstruction to promote both good and evil political regimes; he demands proof that deconstruction could ever be used
112. See supra notes 9, 15, 31-40 and accompanying text.
113. For example, he insists that deconstruction does not "correspond (though certain people have an interest in spreading this confusion) to a quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethicopolitico-juridical question of justice and before the opposition between just and unjust." Derrida,
supra note 4, at 953. But this failure of correspondence may mean either that deconstruction properly employed and understood - need not lead to injustice, or that it cannot do so. Even if
people do not use deconstructive arguments to efface the distinction between the just and the
unjust, they might still use deconstructive arguments to argue for what is unjust through sophistical means.
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for a bad purpose. 114 This burden is easily met, however: As the first
part of this essay shows, it takes very little effort to produce numerous
examples of deconstructive arguments that point in opposite directions.115 In his Cardozo Law School address, Derrida tries a different
tack. He seems to suggest that any example of deconstruction that
leads to injustice is not really deconstructive, just as no example of law
is ever fully just. In his view, both deconstruction and justice are impossible. Thus, deconstruction itself can never be unjust; in fact, Derrida asserts, "Deconstruction is justice." 116 In these passages, Derrida
simply offers a mystical equation between justice and deconstruction;
he strings together provocative metaphysical formulas but does not
begin to offer a convincing argument for them.
Nevertheless, it is possible to make sense of deconstruction's
proper relationship to justice, and, in the process, to offer a more charitable interpretation of Derrida's rather obscure discussion. To solve
this quandary, let us distinguish between deconstructive arguments
made by human beings, which we might call the rhetorical practice of
deconstruction, and the relationship of mutual dependence and differentiation that exists between human values and human language, convention, and culture. In this relationship, human conventions
articulate human values but never fully capture them. Let us call this
relationship of simultaneous inadequacy and dependence the normative chasm between inchoate human values and their cultural
articulations. 117 .
What is the relationship of the rhetorical practice of deconstructive
argument to this normative chasm? When people make deconstructive arguments about justice, they make use of this chasm in two ways.
First, their arguments implicitly rely on values which, to some indefinite degree, transcend human conventions. Second, their critiques
partially describe the discrepancy between law, convention, and culture and the human values of justice and truth. Yet deconstructive
arguments that make use of this normative chasm are not themselves
identical to this chasm, nor do they ever articulate it completely. In114. See, e.g., Derrida, Biodegradab/es, supra note 8, at 827 (rejecting the claim of a critic
that deconstruction can be used for either "fascist" or "liberal'' purposes and demanding "some
proof, please, some arguments, some examples, at least one example!").
115. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45; see also Balkin, supra note 3, at 1613-25
(offering competing readings of a U.S. Supreme Court opinion on parental rights).
116. Derrida, supra note 4, at 945.
117. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Plato was among the first philosophers to stress this relationship; it is a principal motivation for his theory of Forms. Cf SEUNG, supra note 24, at 209-10.
Nevertheless, one does not have to accept the entire ontological baggage of the Forms to acknowledge Plato's genius in recognizing this fundamental inadequacy between our indeterminate
values and their articulations in the world of culture.
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deed, because human values are inchoate and indeterminate and
human conventions are indefinite in their reach and scope, the relationship between the two is doubly problematic. It may even be misleading to think of this normative gap as a single, homogenous thing
that any mind could ever grasp or describe as a totality. Thus, there
are two things that human law, language, and convention fail adequately to capture: The first are the human values on the other side of
the normative chasm; the second is the chasm itself.
The human practice of deconstructive argument always involves a
limited use of the normative gap between value and articulation. It is
limited in two senses. First, a deconstructive argument must always
begin somewhere, at a certain place or with a certain target. Each
deconstructive argument shows the instability of the distinctions with
which it starts, and the mutual dependence and differentiation of the
conceptual oppositions it targets. Yet these deconstructive arguments
themselves must rely on distinctions and conceptual oppositions,
otherwise they could not be expressed in language and understood by
others. Furthermore, no deconstructive argument destabilizes all of
the conceptual structures in language or culture at once; for every distinction it contests, it leaves unexamined thousands more. Thus, every
deconstructive argument fails ultimately to offer an adequate account
of the normative chasm; instead it examines and articulates only a little part of this phenomenon, using conceptual tools that are already
symptoms and effects of this chasm.
Second, each deconstructive argument must come to an end. It
generally ends with a conclusion that a particular distinction or set of
distinctions is effaced, undecidable, or more complicated than one had
first imagined. It ends when the deconstructor believes that she has
reached an appropriate degree of enlightenment from the process of
deconstructive argument. 118 For example, Derrida ends his essay on
de Man by showing that de Man's situation is more complicated than
his critics thought. So deconstruction as practiced by human beings
always arrives at a conclusion in two senses of the word - both an
end and a result of reasoning. Yet the decision to stop and assess the
conclusions of one's argument, to state them as conclusions - in both
senses of that word - leaves unspoken the many further steps that
could be taken. These additional steps could lead to a partial or even a
complete transformation of the conclusions just arrived at. Thus,
from another perspective, the conclusion of a deconstructive argument
is a conclusion in neither sense of the word: for it does not end the
118. See Balkin, supra note 1, at 766.

March 1994]

Transcendental Deconstruction

1179

possible lines of deconstructive argument, nor does it lead to a fixed
and determinate result.
We thus obtain the curious result that the discrepancy between
value and articulation that makes each human practice of deconstruction possible is itself indescribable through the finite rhetorical practice of deconstruction. One might try to imagine a God's-eye point of
view from which all the mutual differentiations and dependences, all
the uncanny reversals and undoings of human conceptual structures,
could be understood and appreciated. But such a view is not possible
for any human intelligence. Thus, the rhetorical practice of deconstructive argument is always inadequate to express the predicament of
human culture that makes this sort of argument possible.
It is possible that, when Derrida speaks of "Deconstruction" in his
more mystical pronouncements, he has in mind something like this
normative chasm, this essential inadequation between transcendent
human values and human culture. If so, then no human practice of
deconstructive argument is "Deconstruction," because no argument
ever fully describes the relationship between value and articulation.
Indeed, such a complete description would be impossible. It would
not follow, however, that "Deconstruction" itself was impossible, only
a fully adequate account of it. So Derrida's equation between L..::construction and justice is flawed. Justice is "impossible" only in the
sense that one never finds a fully and categorically just act in this
world. Yet "Deconstruction" is not impossible, even though one
never finds a fully deconstructive argument. The relationship of mutual dependence and differentiation that exists between culture and
value is not impossible; it is the case. Moreover, it is simply not true,
as Derrida asserts, that Deconstruction is justice. This assertion is a
confusion of the normative chasm between culture and value with a
particular inchoate and indefinite human value. Derrida's mystical
formula simply obscures a valuable insight. 11 9
119. In other words, if Derrida were correct that Deconstruction is justice because both are
impossible of attainment, then Deconstruction would not only be justice, but also beauty, wisdom, and temperance, as none of these virtues is perfectly realized in this world. A more appropriate view would be Derrida's assertion that "deconstruction takes place in the interval that
separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructibility of droit (authority, legitimacy, and so on)." Derrida, supra note 4, at 945 (first emphasis added). In other words, Deconstruction is the gap itself, rather than one side or another of this gap.
If by Deconstruction Derrida means this normative gap, Deconstruction would not even be
an activity of human beings. Instead Deconstruction would simply be the case that there is a
fundamental inadequation. Thus, elsewhere Derrida suggests that "[d]econstruction takes place,
it is an event that does not await the deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject, or
even of modernity. It deconstructs it-self." Letter from Jacques Derrida to a Japanese Friend 4,
reprinted in DERRIDA AND DIFFERANCE l-5 (David Wood & Robert Bernasconi eds., 1988)
[hereinafter Letter from Derrida]. This "it," Derrida insists, "is not ... an impersonal thing that
is opposed to some egological subjectivity." Id. It is not the result of a subject applying a force
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This account of Deconstruction also explains two other puzzling
Derridean statements. The first is Derrida's insistence that Deconstruction is not a method or a technique. 120 The second is his assertion that Deconstruction itself, like justice, is not deconstructible. 121
Derrida's repeated denial that deconstruction is a method or a
practice - and therefore, unlike these denials, not repeatable - has
struck many as strange and possibly a clever way of dodging criticism:
if deconstruction is not a method, then only a certain elect- presumably Jacques Derrida and his followers - can tell whether a given
argument is truly deconstructive or not. They can thus disown all
examples that put their practices in a bad light. Whether or not Derrida has sought to shield himself from criticism through obfuscation,
there is another, more charitable way of accounting for his statements.
Derrida's insistence on separating deconstruction from "method,, is
consistent with a view of Deconstruction as a normative chasm that
cannot adequately be captured by any human rhetorical practice of
deconstructive argument. This chasm is not part of any conventional
practice of deconstruction; rather, it is what these conventions imperfectly articulate. The human practices of deconstructive argument are
conventional, repeatable, transmissible, and hence deconstructible. In
contrast, Deconstruction - which is the case that there is an indescribable inadequacy between human values and their articulations
- is not a convention, and hence it is not deconstructible. 122
Nevertheless, it follows that deconstructive arguments are surely
part of a practice or convention of deconstructive rhetoric. This claim
has two consequences. First, the practice of deconstructive argument
is as deconstructible as any other set of conventional understandings
and practices. This resolves the question left unanswered earlier in
this essay. We noted that if deconstruction argument were a repeatable rhetorical practice, expressible through repeatable linguistic signs
and conventions, it would be subject to "ideological drift,,: The insertion of deconstructive arguments into new and different contexts
would result in arguments with widely varying political and moral valences. This would mean both (1) that deconstructive arguments
to an object. It would perhaps be better to say simply that "Deconstruction happens,'' or "There
is Deconstruction".
120. See Letter from Derrida, supra note 119, at 3.
121. Derrida, supra note 4, at 945.
122. A similar argument would apply to justice. Only human culture, law, and convention
are deconstructible because, and to the extent that, they depend upon but vary from inchoate
human values. A human value like justice would not be deconstructible, although any particular
articulation of it would be, just as the normative gap - Deconstruction itself - would not be
deconstructible, although any particular articulation of it would be.
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could be used for a variety of different political purposes, depending
on the context in which they were offered; and (2) that any normative
uses of deconstruction would themselves be subject to further deconstructive critique.
These conclusions are fully warranted. Deconstructive argument,
like all other forms of rhetoric, is a communal practice existing in various human institutions. It can be - and is - learned and taught,
copied and parodied, understood and misunderstood. It can be - and
is - the subject of countless Ph.D. theses and books. It is repeatable
and transmissible, like all other features of human life existing in and
articulated through human language and human social conventions.
It is therefore subject to the vagaries of iterability and ideological drift.
It is deconstructible.123
Furthermore, because deconstructive argument is a practice of
rhetoric, it is hardly surprising that it can be used for good or for ill.
Like all rhetoric, deconstructive argument is a form of persuasive advocacy. As Aristotle pointed out, the advocate always takes large portions of her audience's beliefs for granted and does not try to contest
them. 124 Instead, she focuses on specific questions and makes use of
beliefs and attitudes that she and her audience hold in common. 125
Some of these beliefs may be only partially correct; others may even be
the result of unthinking acceptance of community norms. Nevertheless, the advocate refrains from attacking them because they actually
assist her in making her argliment.
In this regard the human practice of deconstructive argument is
much the same as other forms of persuasive rhetoric. It begins somewhere and ends somewhere. It takes certain features of culture and
123. It might seem strange for me to note the obvious - that people learn to deconstruct in
departments of comparative literature, that theses on deconstruction that repeatedly apply
deconstructive arguments are produced in great numbers, that these theses are criticized or applauded as good and bad examples, that people can apply the varieties of deconstructive arguments they find in certain texts to later problems, and that other members of the relevant
interpretive community of deconstructive scholars agree that these later applications are also
deconstructive. I emphasize these features - the repeatability and the communal nature of
deconstructive practice - precisely because Jacques Derrida has always been so uncomfortable
with such statements, leading as they do to the conclusion that there is, after all, a deconstructive
method, that can be taught, practiced, and repeatedly applied in new situations. At the same
time, Derrida has been quick to point out that certain arguments are misstatements of deconstruction, that others are poorly performed versions of deconstruction, and that particular deconstructive readings are themselves subject to further deconstruction. My theory of
Deconstruction as a normative chasm shows how one might consistently hold these positions;
nevertheless it commits Derrida - and other deconstructionists - to something like a transcendental account of deconstruction.
124. See ARISTOTLE, THE "ART" OF RHETORIC, Book I, § 1.12 (John H. Freese trans., Loeb
Classical Library 1982).
125. See id.
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convention for granted and uses them to deconstruct others. Thus,
people can use deconstructive argument for different purposes because
they can begin their critiques with different texts or different features
of the same text. Because the normative chasm between value and
articulation applies to all aspects of human culture and convention,
there will always be some discrepancy or instability to deconstruct in
every conceptual structure and in every normative position. Thus, depending upon where one starts and where one ends, one can put into
question different distinctions and conceptual oppositions that support
or justify different interpretations or different actions.
If deconstructive argument is a form of rhetorical practice, then
the ethical status of deconstruction is very much like the question of
the relationship of rhetoric to ethics. The latter question has been the
focus of a great historical debate. Quintilian, the great Roman theorist
of rhetoric, claimed that good oratory is a good person speaking
well. 126 This statement might be read to suggest that well-done oratory must also serve a just objective and, conversely, that arguments
motivated by an unjust purpose or a bad character will always manifest poor rhetorical style. 127 Although this position has had its adherents throughout history, 128 many people consider it wishful
thinking. 129 A more common position on the ethics of rhetoric is that
of Plato, who compared rhetoric to cosmetics, flattery, and the baking
of pastries. 130 Plato argued that rhetoric misleads people by giving
certain positions an artificial appeal, just as a pastry chef gives food an
artificial appeal that is undeserved given its lack of nutritional
value. 131 Thus, far from always serving just ends, rhetoric was a device inherently designed to falsify and obfuscate.
Aristotle struck a middle position between these two extremes. He
emphasized that rhetoric is a useful and important feature of public
126. 4 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO 0RATOR1A, Book XII, § 1.1 (H.E. Butler trans., Loeb
Classical Library 1961).
127. See id., §§ 1.3-.13.
128. A recent example is RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS 5-15 (1992), which argues that
unjust judicial opinions usually display rhetorical flaws.
129. Quintilian himself recognized that "common opinion is practically unanimous in [rejecting] this view." QUINTILIAN, supra note 126, § 1.14. His claim is all the more puzzling given
that he was involved in the training of lawyers, who are taught to argue both sides of a case with
equal ability. However, Quintilian's position was motivated by a much more plausible one: He
believed that the proper use of rhetoric could only be guaranteed by a rigorous moral education
that produced a good character; hence he felt that rhetorical and moral education must occur
together. See id., §§ 2.1-.2.
130. PLATO, Gorgias, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 20, at 229 (W.D. Woodhead
trans., 1953).

131. Id. at 245-57.
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life. 132 But its publicity means that it can be used for many different
purposes. 133 It is surely wrong to employ rhetoric for evil ends; nevertheless, it is worthwhile to be able to argue both sides of a case precisely so that one can better respond to the unjust use of rhetoric when
one encounters it. 134 Although one can use rhetoric for good or for ill,
the same can be said of many useful things, like strength, health,
wealth, and strategic expertise. 135 Rhetoric's ability to be employed
for both good and wicked purposes should lead us to recognize the
responsibility that each of us has for the arguments that he or she
makes. Each of us - Derrida and de Man included - may become
skillful at persuasion. Yet with this skill comes responsibility. Like all
other kinds of rhetoric, we must use the practice of deconstruction
responsibly, because the practice itself will not guarantee the purity of
our motives or the goodness of our actions.
CONCLUSION

The encounter between deconstruction and justice has changed
both parties; yet, of the two, deconstruction appears to be the more
transformed. If deconstructive practice is to be of any use to the question of justice, it must become a transcendental deconstruction. It
must exchange the logic of the infinite for that of the indefinite. It
must act in the service of human values that go beyond culture, convention, and law. It must recognize the chasm that differentiates
human value from articulated conceptions of it, and it must identify
Deconstruction with that chasm. Finally, one must understand
deconstructive practice as .a rhetorical practice that employs Deconstruction but is not identical to it. Because deconstructive practice is a
practice, it is repeatable, teachable, and alterable like any other human
convention. Because it is rhetorical, it can be used for good or for ill.
There is one more transformation yet to come. Understanding the
subject of justice must lead us to reunderstand the subject. Derrida
speaks repeatedly of the "infinite demand" of justice. But his metaphor obscures a central point: Justice does not demand anything, for
justice is not a person that could demand. Justice is a human value. It
132. Cf ARISTOTLE, supra note 124, Book I, § 1.10 (offering arguments for the utility of
rhetoric).
133. As George Kennedy reminds us, "Aristotle was the first person to recognize clearly that
rhetoric as an art of communication was morally neutral, that it could be used either for good or
ill." George A. Kennedy, Introduction to ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC ix (George A. Kennedy
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
134. ARISTOTLE, supra note 124, Book I, § 1.12.
135. See id., § 1.13.
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is a value lodged in the hearts of human beings. It is people who demand justice, and who demand it of one another.
Derrida's placement of justice in the role of the grammatical subject - the subject who demands justice - obscures the fact that the
real subject of justice is, and always has been, not a concept, not a
grammatical subject, but a person. This subject of justice is someone
who can experience justice and injustice, who can feel wronged or vindicated, harmed or helped, who can understand that she or someone
else has been treated justly or unjustly.
There is something uncannily appropriate in Derrida's way of expressing himself, replacing the individual subject with a grand abstraction. Deconstruction first came to public attention in the wake of
structuralism, an intellectual movement that effaced the human subject and sought to explain it as an effect or byproduct of language and
culture. These attempts to dissolve the human subject were in tum
part of a larger tendency in French thought toward antihumanism. 136
Derrida broke with structuralism in several respects, but not in this
one. He adopted the largely antihumanist assumptions then reigning
in French intellectual life, as well as the unfortunate tendency in Continental philosophy to make grammatical subjects out of philosophical
predicates.
In fact, there has always been the temptation in Derrida's work to
do without the individual human subject, to speak of Deconstruction,
but not of deconstructors; of signs, but not those who signify; of meanings, but not those who mean; of justice, but not of people who value
the just. Especially in his early works, one sometimes finds the suggestion that there are simply signs pointing to each other, without the
necessary support of any human intelligence.t37
Nevertheless, this raises a serious difficulty. How can there be
signs without subjects to understand them? After all, as Charles
Sanders Pierce defined it, a sign is something that stands for something
else to somebody in some relation or context. 138 Without the "somebody" to make or understand the sign, signification becomes impossible, and Derrida's philosophical project falls apart. Thus, although
antihumanism and semiotics are often identified with each other, in
fact they are mutually incompatible.
136. On French antihumanism, see KATE SOPER, HUMANISM AND ANTI-HUMANISM
(1986).
137. See, e.g., DERRIDA, supra note 75, at 25 ("[T]he meaning of meaning ... is infinite
implication, the indefinite referral of signifier to signifier.").
138. 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PIERCE~ 228 (Charles Hartshorne &
Paul Weiss eds., 1960).
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One way out of this difficulty is to postulate a Transcendental Subject who does all of the work of meaning and understanding all signs.
This is the Hegelian solution; it projects human intelligence onto a
single great Mind. The second solution, which Derrida has occasionally toyed with over' the years, is semiotic materialism. 139 It argues
that signs are material traces or are formed from the juxtapositions of
material elements. Thus, a sign does not need to be understood by
anyone in order to exist as a sign; its semiotic character is ensured by
its relationship to other signs without the mediation of a consciousness. Moreover, instead of explaining signs in terms of consciousness,
as Pierce did, we explain consciousness in terms of signs. So the self
becomes an "effect" or "determination" of a system of differentiated
signs. 140 Neither of these solutions is completely satisfactory. A third
and better solution is simply to abandon antihumanism and to reemphasize the importance of individual subjects in the creation of a culture that in tum creates them.
Deconstruction's confrontation with questions of justice presses
this third alternative upon us; confronting the question of justice raises
the problem of the subject with renewed urgency. Derrida wants to
speak of responsibility and choice; he wants to say that de Man's critics are unfair and that de Man was a good and generous person. He
wants to assert that each of us has an infinite responsibility to the
Other. Yet, in order to speak in this way, he needs subjects who are
response-able - who can make choices and can be praised or blamed,
rewarded or held responsible for them. His arguments about· justice
become incoherent unless he assumes the existence of individuals who
are more than the products of cultural writing, and who can bear a
responsibility to others, whether this responsibility is infinite or
indefinite.
Thus, the antihumanist vocabulary that has for so long been associated with deconstruction must be abandoned when deconstruction
confronts questions of justice in the real world. Once again, it is interesting to look at the treatment of the subject in Derrida's essays about
Paul de Man. In these essays, Derrida jettisons the antihumanist rhetoric of his earlier writings. He speaks of individual actions, individual
139. Cf. RICHARD HARLAND, SUPERSTRUCTURALISM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF STRUCTURALISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM 146-54 (1987); T.K. SEUNG, STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 256-57 (1982).
140. See JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA 147 (David B. Allison trans.,
Northwestern Univ. Press 1973) (1967-1968). Of course, the words "effect" and "determination" must be put in quotes because the very notions of "cause" and "effect" become inadequate
in Derrida's approach. Id.
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meanings, and individual responsibilities. 141 Indeed, when Derrida
discusses the ethical responsibilities of de Man and his critics in these
writings, one could easily be forgiven for mistaking his discourse with
familiar liberal notions of autonomy and free will.
The subject who emerges from deconstruction's encounter with
justice may not be in all respects the relatively autonomous subject of
traditional political theory; nevertheless, she is a person who can
choose and hence bear the responsibility for her choices. 142 Deconstruction's encounter with justice shows how urgently the concept of a
socially constructed subject needs revision. The challenge is to integrate deconstructive insights about language and meaning with the reality of individual subjects and the claims of individual responsibility.
The transcendental conception of deconstruction can prove helpful in
this endeavor. It argues that human beings articulate their values
through culture and conventions. But this articulation is by no means
uniformly limiting. To the contrary, the articulation of human values
through language and culture simultaneously empowers individuals.
Although the cultural articulation of human values fails fully to capture these values, at the same time it opens up possibilities for action
and hence for responsibility. It creates degrees of moral and practical
freedom. 143 Thus, contrary to antihumanist assumptions, culture and
language do not efface human autonomy but are the conditions of its
very possibility.
In one sense, it was inevitable that deconstructionists would have
to rethink deconstruction's relationship to the subject the moment
they became concerned with questions of justice. The notion of responsibility toward others presupposes people who can be responsible.
The idea of an indefinite demand presupposes people to whom this
demand can be addressed. The attempt to deconstruct systems of law
or legal doctrines presupposes concern about the people unjustly affected by them. Finally, the transcendental conception of deconstruction inevitably leads us back to the individual subject. For this
conception locates justice not as a determinate, unchanging Idea in
Heaven but as a value or urge within the human soul; hence the importance of paying attention to the person possessing that soul.

141. See, e.g., Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 825-28.
142. Drucilla Cornell reaches a similar conclusion in her study of the ethics of deconstruction. See CORNELL, supra note 75, at 149; cf. Binder, supra note 75, at 1383 ("There can be no
right of self-determination if there is no self.").
143. These arguments are further elaborated in J.M. Balkin, Cultural Software, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).

